Press Release
ISLAMABAD, February 11, 2009: India yet can’t compete against China on a nuclear platform, Brigadier (Retd) Samson Simon Sharaf, a renowned security analyst, said here Wednesday. He was giving a talk on ‘The Significance of Military Geography and Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia’ arranged by the South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI), an independent think tank dedicated to promoting peace and stability in South Asia.
Brigadier (Retd) Samson Simon Sharaf presented deterrence in relation to both India and Pakistan, stating that India yet cannot compete against China on a nuclear platform. He also discussed the constraints on the Indian nuclear capabilities and explained the Indian nuclear doctrine as well.
The former army officer also gave details about impacts of the recent US-India nuclear deal on deterrence in South Asia and addressed the Kargil conflict and the prospects of limited conflict between two South Asian nuclear states. He also explained the dimensions of nuclear deterrence in Pakistan and Indian coercion techniques. He said that on the one side are those who think deterrence is difficult.
“They focus on the complexities of the escalation ladder, and the need to deter highly aggressive, revisionist, risk-taking opponents under all foreseeable contingencies. Having taken major nuclear powers into confidence India appears to have followed this course,” he elaborated.
Defining the deterrence as “to threaten a response to a given action in order that the perpetrator is convinced that the benefits of the action will be outweighed by the costs incurred and is thus persuaded not to act as planned,” Brig (Retd) Sharaf said on the other side are those who think that nuclear weapons make deterrence easy. He said they tend to support policies of minimum deterrence, the logic being that deterrence is made effective by the appalling consequences of even small nuclear strikes. He said in Pakistan, the jargons such as credible, minimum, matching and continuously upgraded deterrence capability make the whole of issue of the nuclear deterrence confusing.
The speaker also went on to elaborate on the strategy of ‘Compellence’ and how it acts as a contrast agent with regard to the strategy of deterrence. He then explained some of the visible dynamics that are associated with deterrence and some facts such as the range of actions at the deterrents disposal, application of the deterrence theory in state of an unequal relationship and also a pre-requisite of an adversarial relationship which is based on strategic differences.
Earlier, in the opening remarks SASSI Director Maria Sultan highlighted the importance of deterrence and introduced the topic. She said that SASSI takes a multi-disciplinary approach focused on strategic stability aimed at bringing together various streams of thought from the social and natural sciences, the policymakers and academia.
Masood Ur Rehman, a research fellow at SASSI, made a brief presentation on deterrence in South Asia. He elaborated on the credibility of nuclear deterrence in South Asia, saying there are several issues which affect the credibility of nuclear deterrence in South Asia. These include the Kashmir issue, water-sharing disputes between India and Pakistan, ambiguous nuclear doctrine, pursuit of BMD technology by India, arms race between India and Pakistan, accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, terrorists or extremists, command and control systems.
Brig (Retd) Samson Simon Sharaf’s presentation was followed by a question-answer session, in which Dr Rifaat Hussain, chairman of the Department of Defence and Strategic Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, said that the Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP) had stated in its manifesto that they would conduct nuclear tests so it was not a surprise for the world. He said that compellence never works but deterrence.
In the end, Maria Sultan thanked the audience and appreciated their presence.
ENDS
