Thursday, May 3, 2012

A tale of two treaties

Before the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came into force in 1970, concerned scientists made dire predictions about the rate at which nuclear weapons would spread around the globe. Thanks in part to the treaty, the gloomiest scenarios have been avoided. But many in the developing world question whether their countries have been fairly compensated for their decisions to forego nuclear weapons -- whether the bargain at the heart of the treaty is being honored. Below, Naeem Ahmad Salik of Pakistan, Adel M. Ali of Egypt, and Sunday Jonah of Nigeria grapple with the question: "How can signatories to the NPT ensure that the treaty's provisions are fairly enforced?"

The basic aims of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) are fairly straightforward: to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons; to provide assurances, through international safeguards, that peaceful nuclear activities will not lead to the production of nuclear weapons; to promote, to the maximum extent consistent with the treaty's other provisions, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and eventually to make progress toward nuclear disarmament.

But enforcement of the treaty's provisions has long been a major challenge -- in part because the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which is empowered to enforce the Safeguards Agreements that it establishes with individual nations, is not empowered to enforce the treaty as a whole. That is, the agency has no executive force. In any case, its role as an international promoter of "Atoms for Peace" is as important as its safeguards function.

Limits on the IAEA's authority, particularly in the field of nuclear security, amount to a set of serious deficiencies in the nonproliferation regime. For example, the agency cannot require states to establish systems for nuclear security. It has no authority to verify that nuclear materials within states are accorded appropriate physical protection. Even guidance on these issues is provided by the agency only on request, and though the IAEA regularly publishes recommendations PDF on these topics, following the recommendations is not mandatory. No nuclear security mandate requires that states adequately protect their nuclear materials. More