U.S.-Iran: Lessons from an Earlier War

U.S.-Iran: Lessons from an Earlier War

New Book—Becoming Enemies—Explores Roots of the Current Crisis with Iran

Ex-Officials' Candid Accounts & Declassified Documents Provide Fresh Details, Illuminate Ongoing Hostility

Washington, D.C., October 12, 2012 – As the crisis between the United States and Iran continues to spiral upwards, it becomes increasingly important to understand how the roots of the two governments' unrelenting mutual animosity may be driving Washington and Tehran toward conflict. A new book featuring remarkably candid recollections by former U.S. officials, along with selected declassified documents, provides an original perspective on the current state of tensions by exploring one of the periods of highest friction—that included direct military clashes—between the two countries since the 1979 Islamic revolution.The Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988 was a pivotal episode in the modern Middle East, in addition to being one of the bloodiest conflicts in recent memory. For various reasons, the United States tilted toward Baghdad. Over the course of the war, Washington provided extensive diplomatic, economic and even military backing to the Iraqis, including tacit support (despite public expressions of opposition) for Baghdad's use of chemical weapons against Iran. These actions, punctuated by direct firefights and the accidental shoot-down of a civilian Iranian airliner, placed Washington and Tehran in direct, bitter opposition.Becoming Enemies presents new angles with which to view those events—as well as today's unfolding crisis. It consists of the results of an unusual conference of former U.S. officials, primarily from the State Department and Central Intelligence Agency, along with a key U.N. diplomat. The meeting was designed to get beyond the available historical record by eliciting first-person accounts, from those directly involved, of how events developed, why U.S. policy took the path that it did, and what the outcomes—intended or otherwise—were.The participants (and their posts at the time of the war) included:

• Charles Cogan, Chief of Near East and South Asia operations at CIA
• Richard Murphy, Assistant Secretary of State
• David Newton, U.S. Ambassador to Baghdad
• Giandomenico Picco, U.N. Assistant Secretary General for political affairs
• Tom Pickering, Assistant Secretary of State, Ambassador to Israel and to the U.N.
• Bruce Riedel, Middle East expert at CIA
• Thomas Twetten, Deputy Chief, then Chief, Near East and South Asia operations at CIA

Along the way, the discussion touched on a number of sensitive issues, providing new disclosures and details about:

• The Carter administration's decision to admit the Shah into the U.S. for medical treatment and its impact on Iranian attitudes. More

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