In theory, Clinton might be right. As the historian John Lewis Gaddis has argued, ‘second terms in the White House open the way for second thoughts’ as they ‘lessen…the influence of domestic political considerations’. Second terms, then, might provide the necessary political space to make the moves it takes to transform deep-rooted conflicts. The most notable example being Ronald Reagan’s road to Damascus type conversion on the wisdom of negotiating with the Soviet Union. This was significantly influenced by his growing fears of nuclear war which came to a head with the Able Archer crisis of 1983. Reagan’s decision to enter into negotiations with Moscow bore fruit when he found in Mikhail Gorbachev, who became the leader of the Soviet Union in March 1985, an interlocutor whom he could trust, leading to aremarkable transformation of US-Soviet relations in the second half of the 1980s. A key factor facilitating this transformation was the sweeping mandate that Reagan secured through his overwhelming election victory. This example raises the question as to whether Obama’s victory - though not as sweeping as Reagan’s - might create a new-found political space within which to make moves which could similarly transform US-Iranian nuclear relations. However, there is an important dimension - and difference - to be noted in the past and present. In 1985, the initiative to end the Cold War came from Gorbachev with his game-changing proposals. Rather than trying to exploit Soviet gestures to weaken the Soviet Union, the Reagan Administration worked with Gorbachev to advance arms control agreements that promoted mutual security.
In December 2012, we are at a stage of negotiations where each side is looking to the other to make a decisive game-changing move. From Tehran's point of view, Iran has already made a number of significant gestures in recent months, most notably the offer to suspend enrichment of 20 per cent Uranium in return for equally calibrated reductions in sanctions. At the same time, it has arguably made a further concession by increasing the level of conversion of its existing stockpile of 20 per cent enriched uranium into fuel plates for its Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) to reassure Western concerns about its nuclear break-out capability. The Iranian leadership believes that the promised concession on the 20 per cent and the actual step of converting half of its stock has not been met with any equivalent reciprocation by the United States and its key allies.
In a classic example of each side failing to understand the other’s position, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France have not interpreted these Iranian moves as conciliatory ones. Consequently, the Western powers are looking to Tehran to make a significant first move in breaking the negotiating impasse when Tehran believes it has already done this. What the Western powers are seeking as an Iranian opening move is the so-called ‘stop, ship, and shut’ policy (freezing 20 per cent production, shipping the existing stockpile of 20 per cent out of the country, and closing the Fordoo plant). They have said that were this to happen, they would then consider reciprocation, including the distant possibility of limited sanctions relief. Such an opening gambit has been interpreted in Tehran as a demand for unilateral concessions dressed up in the garb of the language of reciprocity. Indeed, former Iranian nuclear negotiator, Hossein Mousavian, likened the Western strategy to one of‘peanuts for diamonds.’ More
