Nuclear Winter of Our Discontent

Always interesting when the Army starts poking around the nation’s nuclear stockpile – seeing as the service is no longer a big player in the atomic realm – to see if atomic weapons still make sense.

Ward Wilson isn’t a soldier – he’s a senior fellow at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at theMonterey Institute of International Studies – but his musing on the topic appears in the latest issue of Parameters, the Army’s professional journal.

By re-studying the U.S. nuclear bombing of Japan that ended World War II in 1945, and the brush with World War III that 1962’s Cuban missile crisis represented, Wilson tries to revamp our understanding of the utility of nuclear weapons.

What this new scholarship reveals is that the failure rate of nuclear deterrence is potentially higher than theory admits.

Nuclear deterrence has to be perfect, or close to perfect. A catastrophic all-out nuclear war could result from any failure of nuclear deterrence, so there is little margin for error. One could say for nuclear deterrence, failure is not an option. Yet these documented cases of nuclear deterrence failure raise the possibility that we have been far luckier, and have run far greater risks, than we imagined. If nuclear deterrence has a high rate of failure, continuing to rely on it for the safety and security of the United States would seem to guarantee its eventual catastrophic failure.

One of the great strengths of the military mind is its insistence on experience-based thinking. In the case of nuclear weapons, there has historically been plenty of theory, but not as much sensible, pragmatic thinking. It is time for a little more pragmatic analysis.

Sobering stuff. Full thing here.

 

Deterrence Stability in South Asia

Dear Colleagues,

Stimson’s next program on Deterrence Stability in South Asia promises to be doubly interesting. Our presenters will be Brig. Gen. (ret.) Feroz Khan of the Naval Postgraduate School, who will discuss a "Strategic Restraint Regime 2.0 for South Asia," and Zachary Davis of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, who will address “Transparency and Deterrence Stability in South Asia."

Feroz is a lecturer in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey. His important book, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb, was recently published by Stanford University Press. Zack Davis is senior fellow at the Center for Global Security Research at Livermore. He is also a visiting research professor at the Naval Postgraduate School.

We will convene on Tuesday, January 15th, at Stimson from 3:00 -4:30pm. We are located at 1111 19th St., NW. Our conference facilities are on the 12th floor. Space is limited.

CLICK HERE TO RSVP

Best wishes,

Michael Krepon

Director, South Asia Program

Stimson

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Stimson's programming on South Asia is supported by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and by the National Nuclear Security Administration.

You may contact Julia Thompson (jthompson@stimson.org) for general inquiries.

 

Perkovich On “The Non-Unitary Model And Deterrence Stability In South Asia”

Stimson is releasing today an essay by George Perkovich on "The Non-Unitary Model and Deterrence Stability in South Asia." Perkovich is the Vice President for Studies and Director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Perkovich argues that classical deterrence models derived from the Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union are too simplistic to apply to South Asia. Pakistan may not be a unitary rational actor in the traditional sense, because violent, extremist groups on its territory that engage in sub-conventional warfare can provoke crises and armed conflict on the subcontinent. These groups may or may not be an extension of Pakistan's military and intelligence services, which may themselves be riven with factions. Consequently, deterrence stability in South Asia presents unique analytical, political, and diplomatic challenges.

The author assesses the threat of India-Pakistan war as more likely than the threat of nuclear terrorism. Perkovich argues that the United States can most effectively pursue its broader nuclear interests and goals through a framework of deterrence stability. The pursuit of deterrence stability would make India and Pakistan "more inclined to engage in dialogue and Confidence-Building Measures... than they are when the agenda seems to reflect other U.S. priorities, such as countering nuclear terrorism or strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime." Moreover, "highlighting the need to prevent Indo-Pakistan conflict and stabilize deterrence between the two countries acknowledges that Pakistan, like India, possesses a nuclear deterrent, and that the United States is not seeking to eliminate it, but rather to encourage the two states to manage it stably."

Perkovich argues that disunity in the chain of command, whether perceived or actual, "produces dangerous confusion and ambiguity that interfere in the management of deterrence.... Pakistan illustrates the unity problem and its implications for rationality more acutely than any other nuclear-armed state." Consequently, "The risks that subconventional uses of force could escalate to conventional and perhaps nuclear war creates a clear interest for Pakistanis, Indians, and the international community to treat the uncertain quality of Pakistani state sovereignty as a fundamental strategic problem."

Thus far, the people of South Asia have been spared the potential consequences of deterrence instability because Indian leaders have not retaliated violently to terrorist attacks on iconic targets. India's neo-Gandhian forbearance runs counter to prescripts of deterrence and cannot be expected to persist as new leaders emerge in New Delhi. More

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