One year after the Fukushima disaster, Japan continues to assess its dependency on nuclear energy
Even before the Fukushima disaster one year ago, Japan's heavy dependence on nuclear energy—notwithstanding the country's devastating experience with nuclear weapons—was contentious both inside and outside the country. In particular, Japan's strong commitment to the development of a self-sufficient plutonium-based nuclear fuel cycle has generated significant controversy domestically, regionally, and globally. Neighboring countries, previously tormented by Japanese militarism, are especially uneasy with the latent nuclear weapon capability implied by Japan's excess plutonium and advanced fuel cycle technology. Some, such as South Korea, are seeking their own closed fuel cycle. And Japan's drive to build the first commercial spent fuel reprocessing plant in a non-nuclear weapon state is seen by some as undermining global efforts to halt the spread of such sensitive technology by providing states such as Iran with a prime example of a "virtual" nuclear weapon state.
In September 2011, six months after Fukushima, Japan began reviewing its entire nuclear energy policy. A key issue has been the future of its planned closed nuclear fuel cycle— involving not only the reprocessing plant but fast breeder reactors to one day burn separated plutonium—and facilities in the meantime to fabricate mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for use in ordinary light water reactors. What Japan decides will have significant implications for regional and global nuclear nonproliferation efforts.
Japan's Ambitious pre-Fukushima Policy
Japan adopted a closed nuclear fuel cycle policy in the 1960s. As a resource-poor and rapidly industrializing country, the intent was to avoid potential uranium shortages as it turned to nuclear energy to mitigate its strong dependence on imported fossil fuels.[1]Some previous government reviews, such as the November 2004 report by the Japan Atomic Energy Commission's (JAEC) New Nuclear Policy Planning Council, acknowledged that some of the assumptions underlying this policy were no longer sound—particularly the short term likelihood of uranium shortages and the relative costs of open and closed fuel cycles. However, these findings failed to slow the momentum toward the closed nuclear fuel cycle given Tokyo's massive investments in relevant facilities.[2] Although that report estimated that the direct disposal option was less expensive than reprocessing, the JAEC concluded that reprocessing was more economical, taking into consideration the cost of a change in policy.[3] This conclusion led to the 2005 Framework for Nuclear Energy Policy, which reconfirmed the importance of commercializing the closed nuclear fuel cycle to promote nuclear energy independence. More
