Modernising the Army’s Tactical-level Communications Systems by Gurmeet Kanwal

Indian Military Review - August-September 2013

India is likely to spend approximately US$ 100 billion (Rs 250,000 crore) over the next ten years on defence acquisitions. However, most of this expenditure will be on weapons platforms like main battle tanks, 155 mm artillery, infantry combat vehicles, fighter aircraft, ships and submarines and very little on command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems (C4I2SR). In fact, the modernisation of communications systems has lagged far behind that of weapons platforms, particularly in the Indian army.

While some modern frequency-hopping radio sets with integral encryption devices have been introduced into service in recent years, networked communications, which form the backbone of an effective command and control system, need substantial upgradation. The existing Plan AREN system that is designed to roll forward and keep pace with offensive operations in the plains has been in service for almost three decades and is based on outdated and bulky technologies like second generation radio relay hubs.

Requests for Information (RFI) were floated for a Tactical Communication System (TCS) for offensive operations and a Battlefield Management System (BMS) for communication at the tactical level in defensive operations a few years ago, but since then the acquisition process has meandered continuously and this has resulted in prolonged delays in introducing both these systems into service.

The new optical fibre network being laid as an alternative to the 3G spectrum surrendered by the armed forces will go a long way in providing modern land-line communications in peace stations and to limited extent up to the war-time locations of higher formation HQ. However, future communication systems will need to provide wide-band data capabilities to facilitate the real time transmission of images and battlefield video while on the move all the way down to armoured and artillery regiments and infantry battalions.

This will be done by the BMS, which will be integrated with the Army Static Communications (ASCON) system. ASCON is the backbone communication network of the army. ASCON provides voice and data links between static headquarters and those in peace-time locations. It is expected to be of modular design so that it can be upgraded as better technology becomes available. The BMS is meant for communications from the battalion headquarters forward to the companies and platoons. It will enable the Commanding Officer to enhance his situational awareness and command his battalion through a secure communications network with built-in redundancy.

The BMS system will integrate all surveillance resources available at the battalion or regiment level, including from locally launched UAVs and ground sensors. It will also provide the accurate location of all the troops and key weapons platforms as well as the location of enemy troops and terrain analysis. The BMS will also automatically receive and transmit data, voice and images from multiple sources above the regiment and battalion level, including radars, cameras and laser range finders, simultaneously providing junior commanders on the battlefield all relevant information that has been received from the Battlefield Surveillance System (BSS). The system will be based on net radio-cum-hand-held computers.

The TCS is a system that is meant for offensive operations – a mobile system that can ‘leapfrog’ forward as offensive operations progress into enemy territory. The offensive operations echelons of the ‘pivot’ or ‘holding’ Corps deployed on the international boundary and the three Strike Corps will be equipped with TCS. TCS will replace the obsolescent Plan AREN system.

It was reported on July 23, 2013, that BMS has been categorised as a ‘make India’ system by the Defence Acquisition Council headed by the Defence Minister. This implies that the system must be designed and developed in India by domestic companies. According to the US-based Defense News, “In the months ahead, expressions of interest (EOIs) will be sent to more than a dozen Indian defence companies, private and state-owned, inviting them to participate in the program. The EOIs are likely to be sent to Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL), Electronics Corporation of India, Computer Maintenance Corporation, ITI, domestic private-sector major Tata Power SED, Rolta India, Wipro, Larsen & Toubro, HCL, Punj Lloyd, Bharat Forge, Tata Consultancy, Info Systems and Tech Mahindra.” This will ensure that Indian companies invest in developing the required communications technology and acquire the ability to design and implement robust tactical communications systems.

MNCs with suitable technologies and the right experience to help the Indian companies should be considered for forming either a joint venture or for buying technology and assistance as system integrators. According to Defense news, “The overseas defence companies expected to compete include Israel Aerospace Industries, Rafael and Elbit of Israel; Thales and Nexter of France; Rhode & Schwartz of Germany; BAE Systems of the UK; Lockheed Martin, Raytheon and General Dynamics of the US; and, Selex of Italy.” Indian companies planning to bid for these contracts must carefully evaluate the technological capabilities of these MNCs and how their systems have fared during recent combat operations, the type of experience they have in integrating tactical communications systems and whether they are likely to bring a long-term commitment to the Indian projects.

Defense News has reported further that “The government expects to select two vendors after four months of evaluation of the EOIs. Each of those two companies will be asked to develop four BMS prototypes for mountain, jungle, plains and desert operations. The development of the prototypes is projected to cost about $67 million with the MoD covering 80 per cent of the expense and the shortlisted domestic company 20 per cent. The prototypes will be put through extensive field trials and the selected defence company will be asked to produce more than 500 systems in India for an estimated $5 billion. It will take up to three years for the final bidder to be selected before production begins.”

Meanwhile, the acquisition process for the TCS system is also underway. Both TCS and BMS will need to be mutually compatible systems and the MNC that can supply state-of-the-art technology for both the systems at competitive prices will have a clear edge. In fact, it may be cost-effective for the MoD to award both the contracts to the same Indian company so that communications compatibility can be ensured.

India must skilfully leverage its buyer’s clout to ensure that each defence acquisition contract results in the transfer of cutting edge defence technology to Indian companies. This is necessary not only for communication systems but also for all other weapons and equipment so that the country's technological threshold is raised by an order of magnitude.

Future defence acquisitions must be firmly rooted in joint research and development with leading MNCs, joint trials and testing and joint manufacture and marketing. The patron-client, buyer-seller relationship in arms procurement in which India had been involved in the past, with first the Soviet Union and then Russia, must be consigned to history as a sorry chapter that is best forgotten. More

(The author is a Delhi-based strategic analyst.)

 

Smith on Tactical Nuclear Weapons in South Asia

The Stimson Center is releasing today an essay by David Smith entitled "The US Experience with Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Lessons for South Asia." Smith served twice as the US Army Attaché to Pakistan, and is now an independent consultant.

After testing nuclear weapons in 1998, Pakistan and India announced nuclear postures of “credible minimum deterrence.” Over the past decade, however, both countries appear to have doubled their stockpiles, and they are adding cruise missiles and sea-based deterrents. Of particular concern has been the Pakistan military's embrace of short-range, or tactical nuclear weapon delivery systems and warheads. India has yet to announce a comparable pursuit.

Smith explores the implications for nuclear stability in South Asia of Pakistan’s current approach to short-range delivery systems and warheads. Drawing from the US – Soviet historical model, Smith predicts three unsettling developments on the subcontinent should Pakistan continue apace: (1) new systems’ development and acquisition will precede development of doctrines concerning their employment; (2) India will match, if not exceed, whatever numbers of weapons Pakistan eventually builds; and (3) for both sides, fissile material production capacity, and not the number perceived to be needed for deterrence, may be the only limit on stockpile size.

Smith notes the reluctance of many in Pakistan to accept the premise that Cold War nuclear lessons posed by tactical nuclear weapons are relevant to South Asia because of the many differences in the two strategic environments. He holds that it is precisely these differences that make the contemporary India-Pakistan dilemma even more dangerous. He argues that the operational dilemmas associated with tactical nuclear weapons are profound and ill-considered. Smith concludes that, “Pakistan’s decision to embrace tactical nuclear weaponry will ultimately require it to deal with the doctrinal implications, increased security and command and control requirements, and the potentially destabilizing implications of deploying such weapons.”

Smith reviews the history of US and NATO deployment of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs), identifying key lessons learned relating to their impact on deterrence and preemption; their efficacy against mobile and armed forces; command, control, and communications; the difficulty of obtaining nuclear release authority for tactical targets; the challenges of securing deployed TNWs and ensuring survivability of nuclear launch units in battle; and, concerns that TNWs’ use in battle would be escalatory but not decisive. After contrasting current US, Indian, and Russian attitudes towards TNWs, Smith explores three Pakistani arguments for their efficacy: (1) to address the conventional imbalance on the subcontinent which favors India; (2) to checkmate India's "Cold Start" doctrine, which seeks to create space for limited conventional war; and (3) to end hostilities without triggering a wider Indian nuclear response.

Finally, Smith assesses the similarities and differences between the Cold War environment and that of South Asia, and suggests “lessons the US and NATO learned at such a high cost” most relevant to Pakistan. He concludes that tactical nuclear weapons will add little to deterrence, will complicate safety and security, will invite preemption, will complicate command, control, and communications, and will be expensive.

Stimson's analytical and prescriptive assessments on the nuclear competition in South Asia are funded by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and by the National Nuclear Security Administration. To access this essay in its entirety, click here.

 

Race to the End

ISLAMABAD — One of the more tenacious conspiracy theories that have taken root in the hothouse of Pakistan's capital is that Osama bin Laden was not killed in the May 2, 2011, Navy SEAL raid on his compound in Abbottabad -- that, in fact, he had already been dead for years, killed in the caves of Tora Bora.

According to this theory, the CIA had been keeping bin Laden's corpse on ice, literally, ready to be resurrected at a moment when his "death" could better serve U.S. interests. That moment came when the SEALs decided to conduct a dry run of their long-planned operation to snatch Pakistan's nuclear weapons. Bin Laden's thawing corpse was brought along as cover in case the exercise blew up -- and as a devious bit of political theater to besmirch Pakistan's reputation if all went well.

What keep conspiracy theories like this alive are bits and pieces of half-baked evidence that could be construed to support a deeply held belief. In this case, it is the belief -- accepted across the board in Pakistan, from the top brass of its military down to the dusty gaggle of taxi drivers who awaited me each morning outside my Islamabad hotel -- that the United States has a not-so-secret plan to snatch Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.

"With 70 to 80 kilos of highly enriched uranium, it would be fairly easy to make one in the basement of a building in the city of your choice," said Pervez Hoodbhoy, a distinguished nuclear physicist at Islamabad's Quaid-i-Azam University.

The United States, which is duly concerned that Pakistan's nukes could fall into the wrong hands, almost certainly does have a plan to neutralize those weapons in the event of a coup or total state collapse. When the question was put to Condoleezza Rice during her 2005 confirmation hearings to become secretary of state, she replied, "We have noted this problem, and we are prepared to try to deal with it."

"Try" is the key word. Military experts -- American, Pakistani, and Indian -- agree that grabbing or disarming all of Pakistan's nukes at this stage would be something close to mission impossible. As one senior Pakistani general told me, "We look at the stories in the U.S. media about taking away our nuclear weapons and this definitely concerns us, so countermeasures have been developed accordingly." Such steps have included building more warheads and spreading them out over a larger number of heavily guarded locations. This, of course, also makes the logistics of securing them against theft by homegrown terrorists that much more complicated.

Fears of that terrifying possibility were heightened in August, when a group of militants assaulted a Pakistani base that some believe houses nuclear weapons components. Nine militants and one soldier were killed in a two-hour firefight at the Kamra air force base. The local media immediately floated the theory that this, too, was part of the American plot to steal Pakistan's nukes. But more disturbing than any conspiracy theory is the reality that this was the fourth attack in five years on the Kamra base, just 20 miles from the capital. At least five other sensitive military installations have also come under attack by militants since 2007. More

 

West Europeans target US nukes at treaty session

UNITED NATIONS - May 6 2010 — Germany and other West European nations at the U.N. nonproliferation conference are calling for elimination of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe — "leftovers from the Cold War" — as a way to advance global arms control.

"They no longer serve a military purpose and do not create security," German state minister Werner Hoyer told fellow delegates to the 189-nation session to review the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

Belgian disarmament official Werner Bauwens, speaking Thursday, the fourth day of the monthlong conference, urged the U.S. and Russia to launch negotiations "as soon as possible" to reduce their shorter-range nuclear weapons. More >>>