ASEAN countries and Russia agree to enhance defence co-operation

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Russia have agreed to collaborate in defence and security-related technologies. The move is aimed at expanding ASEAN capability to address strategic threats and consolidate Russia's already strong position in Southeast Asian defence markets.

Following a meeting of the 12th ASEAN-Russian joint co-operation committee (ARJCC) in Indonesia on 30 April, ASEAN said the two sides will undertake projects focused on developing remote sensing and positioning systems.

ASEAN said the partnership would also feature a joint project related to GLONASS, Russia's military-operated satellite navigation system. ASEAN did not elaborate on this plan, although it is understood that it encompasses potential ASEAN participation in the development and installation of ground-based GLONASS stations in the region.

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Modernising the Army’s Tactical-level Communications Systems by Gurmeet Kanwal

Indian Military Review - August-September 2013

India is likely to spend approximately US$ 100 billion (Rs 250,000 crore) over the next ten years on defence acquisitions. However, most of this expenditure will be on weapons platforms like main battle tanks, 155 mm artillery, infantry combat vehicles, fighter aircraft, ships and submarines and very little on command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems (C4I2SR). In fact, the modernisation of communications systems has lagged far behind that of weapons platforms, particularly in the Indian army.

While some modern frequency-hopping radio sets with integral encryption devices have been introduced into service in recent years, networked communications, which form the backbone of an effective command and control system, need substantial upgradation. The existing Plan AREN system that is designed to roll forward and keep pace with offensive operations in the plains has been in service for almost three decades and is based on outdated and bulky technologies like second generation radio relay hubs.

Requests for Information (RFI) were floated for a Tactical Communication System (TCS) for offensive operations and a Battlefield Management System (BMS) for communication at the tactical level in defensive operations a few years ago, but since then the acquisition process has meandered continuously and this has resulted in prolonged delays in introducing both these systems into service.

The new optical fibre network being laid as an alternative to the 3G spectrum surrendered by the armed forces will go a long way in providing modern land-line communications in peace stations and to limited extent up to the war-time locations of higher formation HQ. However, future communication systems will need to provide wide-band data capabilities to facilitate the real time transmission of images and battlefield video while on the move all the way down to armoured and artillery regiments and infantry battalions.

This will be done by the BMS, which will be integrated with the Army Static Communications (ASCON) system. ASCON is the backbone communication network of the army. ASCON provides voice and data links between static headquarters and those in peace-time locations. It is expected to be of modular design so that it can be upgraded as better technology becomes available. The BMS is meant for communications from the battalion headquarters forward to the companies and platoons. It will enable the Commanding Officer to enhance his situational awareness and command his battalion through a secure communications network with built-in redundancy.

The BMS system will integrate all surveillance resources available at the battalion or regiment level, including from locally launched UAVs and ground sensors. It will also provide the accurate location of all the troops and key weapons platforms as well as the location of enemy troops and terrain analysis. The BMS will also automatically receive and transmit data, voice and images from multiple sources above the regiment and battalion level, including radars, cameras and laser range finders, simultaneously providing junior commanders on the battlefield all relevant information that has been received from the Battlefield Surveillance System (BSS). The system will be based on net radio-cum-hand-held computers.

The TCS is a system that is meant for offensive operations – a mobile system that can ‘leapfrog’ forward as offensive operations progress into enemy territory. The offensive operations echelons of the ‘pivot’ or ‘holding’ Corps deployed on the international boundary and the three Strike Corps will be equipped with TCS. TCS will replace the obsolescent Plan AREN system.

It was reported on July 23, 2013, that BMS has been categorised as a ‘make India’ system by the Defence Acquisition Council headed by the Defence Minister. This implies that the system must be designed and developed in India by domestic companies. According to the US-based Defense News, “In the months ahead, expressions of interest (EOIs) will be sent to more than a dozen Indian defence companies, private and state-owned, inviting them to participate in the program. The EOIs are likely to be sent to Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL), Electronics Corporation of India, Computer Maintenance Corporation, ITI, domestic private-sector major Tata Power SED, Rolta India, Wipro, Larsen & Toubro, HCL, Punj Lloyd, Bharat Forge, Tata Consultancy, Info Systems and Tech Mahindra.” This will ensure that Indian companies invest in developing the required communications technology and acquire the ability to design and implement robust tactical communications systems.

MNCs with suitable technologies and the right experience to help the Indian companies should be considered for forming either a joint venture or for buying technology and assistance as system integrators. According to Defense news, “The overseas defence companies expected to compete include Israel Aerospace Industries, Rafael and Elbit of Israel; Thales and Nexter of France; Rhode & Schwartz of Germany; BAE Systems of the UK; Lockheed Martin, Raytheon and General Dynamics of the US; and, Selex of Italy.” Indian companies planning to bid for these contracts must carefully evaluate the technological capabilities of these MNCs and how their systems have fared during recent combat operations, the type of experience they have in integrating tactical communications systems and whether they are likely to bring a long-term commitment to the Indian projects.

Defense News has reported further that “The government expects to select two vendors after four months of evaluation of the EOIs. Each of those two companies will be asked to develop four BMS prototypes for mountain, jungle, plains and desert operations. The development of the prototypes is projected to cost about $67 million with the MoD covering 80 per cent of the expense and the shortlisted domestic company 20 per cent. The prototypes will be put through extensive field trials and the selected defence company will be asked to produce more than 500 systems in India for an estimated $5 billion. It will take up to three years for the final bidder to be selected before production begins.”

Meanwhile, the acquisition process for the TCS system is also underway. Both TCS and BMS will need to be mutually compatible systems and the MNC that can supply state-of-the-art technology for both the systems at competitive prices will have a clear edge. In fact, it may be cost-effective for the MoD to award both the contracts to the same Indian company so that communications compatibility can be ensured.

India must skilfully leverage its buyer’s clout to ensure that each defence acquisition contract results in the transfer of cutting edge defence technology to Indian companies. This is necessary not only for communication systems but also for all other weapons and equipment so that the country's technological threshold is raised by an order of magnitude.

Future defence acquisitions must be firmly rooted in joint research and development with leading MNCs, joint trials and testing and joint manufacture and marketing. The patron-client, buyer-seller relationship in arms procurement in which India had been involved in the past, with first the Soviet Union and then Russia, must be consigned to history as a sorry chapter that is best forgotten. More

(The author is a Delhi-based strategic analyst.)

 

Defense in an Age of Austerity

Unless the U.S. Congress and the Obama administration avert the mandated sequestration of $1.2 trillion from the discretionary accounts of the federal budget, then severe cuts of nearly equal amounts will be imposed on U.S. defense and domestic programs beginning in March 2013.

In other words, if and when this sequestration occurs, the U.S. defense budget will be reduced by some $500 billion beyond the $487 billion in cuts already programmed over the next decade by the U.S. Department of Defense.

Where might the department find these savings? Some could and should be found by introducing further efficiencies, reforming acquisition practices, and adjusting personnel compensation packages. But these steps alone would not yield savings of the magnitude that might be required.

Reductions of the magnitude implied by sequestration should not be made without a reexamination of the current U.S. defense strategy. The department would no longer be able to afford the suite of capabilities envisioned by U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta in his strategic guidance issued in January 2012. Although making across-the-board cuts or eliminating programs that offer prompt savings would be tempting options, they would yield an unbalanced force in the short term and potentially higher program costs in future years.

Reductions of the magnitude implied by sequestration should not be made without a reexamination of the current U.S. defense strategy.

The prudent approach would be to decide first on a strategic direction, clarifying which forces and equipment the United States should preserve as priorities and which could be cut back or eliminated. Establishing a strategic direction prior to such reductions would limit the risk they might impose or, at the very least, make that risk explicit to U.S. leaders. This effort would entail prioritization of the defense challenges and of what risks to accept, with program and budget decisions following.

While not advocating further defense cuts, we offer three alternative ways to cut roughly $400–$500 billion more from U.S. defense programs over the next decade without crippling the force. At the upper end, this amount reaches the level of cuts suggested by the sequestration mandate. Each alternative strategic direction is summarized below, outlining the force reductions and other programmatic cuts that would be necessary to achieve the targeted savings. To further illuminate the dialogue that can and should take place, we make explicit the risks that would be incurred by following one or another of the alternative strategic directions. These alternatives are not mutually exclusive, and combinations of features of each are possible.

Alternative I

Prepare for Persistent Land-Based Conflict

Projected Savings, Fiscal Years 2014–2023: $488–$523 billion

This option assumes that violent extremism and related insurgencies will outlast efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan and remain a serious threat to the United States and its interests — first and foremost, the protection of its citizenry. Therefore, readiness to respond to that threat must remain a top U.S. defense priority. This alternative retains the capability to commit sizable U.S. land forces for counterinsurgency and stabilization operations. Ground forces would not be scaled back beyond the reductions outlined by Panetta in January 2012. However, aviation and maritime forces would be drawn down further than currently planned. More

 

Analysis: Obama faces bumps with Russia policy

WASHINGTON (AP) — President Barack Obama once assured Russian leaders that he'd have more flexibility to deal with missile defense during a second term in office. But now that he has been re-elected, there's little expectation of progress on that or other contentious issues that divide the two countries.

Tensions between the United States and Russia have been rising. The countries have been at odds over Syria's civil war, Iran's nuclear program and Russia's crackdown on domestic opposition. U.S. officials are uneasy about what they see as a more assertive foreign policy by Vladimir Putin, who returned to the Russian presidency in May.

Gone is the talk of a "reset" — Obama's policy of improving relations with Moscow after they deteriorated during George W. Bush's presidency. In the few areas where Obama is seeking closer ties, such as trade, he's running into opposition from a deeply divided Congress.

Moscow is undoubtedly pleased that Obama defeated Republican Mitt Romney, who had called Russia the No. 1 foe of the United States. A Russian official said Thursday that its government expected Obama to meet his commitment to be more flexible on missile defense.

But it's hard to imagine that happening now.

"Since Putin's return to the presidency, things have become more complicated," said Cliff Kupchan, a Russia analyst with the Eurasia group, who described the current state of relations as functional, but strained.

The reset undoubtedly improved cooperation between Washington and Moscow during the early years of the Obama administration and both sides saw dividends, such as the signing of a nuclear arms control treaty and the U.S. agreeing to Russia's entry into the World Trade Organization.

During that time, tensions over missile defense had receded following Obama's early move to replace a Bush administration plan for missile defense in eastern Europe. Moscow, which had angrily charged that the Bush era plan could undermine its ability to use long-range nuclear missiles to deter attacks initially, welcomed the change. But more recently, the Kremlin has ramped up its criticism, arguing that the later stages of the Obama plan could also threaten its missiles. More

 

The Ayatollah's Pregnant Pause

What's behind the "new" intelligence on Iran's nuclear program?

On Aug. 9, the Israeli newspaper Haaretz reported that U.S. President Barack Obama has received a new Special National Intelligence Estimate finding that "Iran has made surprising, significant progress toward military nuclear capability." U.S. officials have refused to confirm that the new estimate exists -- either on the record or anonymously -- but the administration has asserted that its overall assessment remains unchanged since its last public statement this January, when James Clapper, the director of national intelligence, said, "Iran is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons … should it choose to do so. We do not know, however, if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons." Defense Secretary Leon Panetta reiterated this view on Tuesday, Aug. 14. Unfortunately, the White House's concerted campaign to criminalize national security discourse has prevented officials from discussing the estimate with journalists, allowing the most alarmist conjecture to dominate public debate.

The "new" intelligence is probably old news, but that's hard to see, especially when reporters and officials continue to misstate the judgments of the now famous 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran's nuclear capabilities and intentions. Unless you have carefully read that report, you are almost certainly misinformed about what it says. Much of the discourse, even among foreign-policy "elites," includes wildly inaccurate assertions, which in turn makes the entire discourse about Iran much, much dumber.

This is not the time to dumb down the discussion of Iran's nuclear programs. There is growing support for military action, and we are entering the homestretch of a U.S. presidential election, when sober policy analysis will take a back seat to rhetorical machismo and blatant pandering to any ill-informed prejudice that might swing a few votes. I don't know if time is drawing short, but my friends and colleagues are clearly wondering about the possibility. Injecting a little realism into this discussions depends, first and foremost, on understanding what the intelligence estimates do, and do not, say. More

 

Illusion Of Missile Defence

The Defense Research and Development Organization DRDO has chosen Delhi and Mumbai, the two vital cities of India, for the ballistic missile sheet. This BMD system will be able to soot down the enemy’s missiles in both within the Earth’s atmosphere and outside it. This decision will be materialized after getting the final approval from the Defense Committee of the Cabinet (DCC), the highest decision making body regarding the defense and security in India . The introduction of BMD to the South Asian security environment will result into the deterrence instability, crisis instability arm race instabilities and will jeopardize the prospects of arms control and disarmament in the region.

India has been embarked aggressively upon the development of BMD system since 2006,however, origin of India’s plan for missile defense, dates back to the early 1980s, when it started its Integrated Missile Development Program (IGDMP).IGDMP consisted of panoply of offensive and defensive missile plate forms such as Pritvi, Agni and Akash. As it is conceived from media the Indian BMD system revolves around the variants of Pritvi and Akash missiles. According to the Indian official sources DRDO used the Pritvi missile as simulated targets. The finally ready version, as per the Indian sources, has the capability to destroy an incoming missile with the range of almost 2000 km.

Technically, BMD system as a concept embodies two distinct but inter-related facets: Theatre Missile Defense (TMD) and National Missile Defense (NMD). The former envisions deploying of a defensive system to protect the military forces at battle field. Such system is usually precise, mobile and quickly deployable across the diverse geographic environments. While the later, in contrast to the former, envisions protecting the population, command centers and vital industrial complexes against the sea and ground based ballistic missiles of enemy.

As the DRDO has signaled out that the ballistic missile defense shield will be deployed around the Mumbai and Delhi in the first phase, which will be extended to the other major cities of India in the next phases, we can easily adjust the Indian BMD system in the NMD category.

Intercepting an incoming missile is like to hit an incoming bullet with a bullet. According to the experts of missile defense the missile interception is an extremely difficult feat even under the perfect testing conditions. But the task would have to be accomplished in an environment for which there has been no actual experience. Since there has not been any real nuclear war between nuclear weapon states, so predicting about the environmental effects on the reliability and efficiency of interceptors in a nuclear exchange would be a futile practice. More

 

US DoD 2012 Defence Budget - Priorities and Choices

 Nave delays new nuclear sub by at least two years.

The debate over defense spending will light its afterburner Thursday afternoon, when SecDef Leon Panetta and Army General Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, invite us into the Pentagon kitchen and show us how they plan to use their knives to trim $487 billion from military spending over the coming decade.

Before the hyperbole begins (oops – sorry – too late for that) check out this “reader’s guide” to the looming fight by Jeff Smith of the Center for Public Integrity (before that, he was a long-time national-security reporter at the Washington Post). Smith straight-forwardedly answers key questions on the defense budget’s size, its impact on job creation, and to what extent the Adminstration is simply trying to cram a strategy into a skinnier wallet. More

US 2012 Defence Budget - Priorities and Choices