What U.S. Could Do if Pakistan Loses Control Over Nuclear Weapons By Elaine M. Grossman

WASHINGTON -- A longtime expert on terrorism and nuclear arms is calling on the United States and others to identify fresh responses to a potential crisis in which a nation such as Pakistan or North Korea loses control over nuclear weapons or fissile material, without the West necessarily intervening by force.

Pakistani nuclear-capable Hatf 2 missile

“Outside intervention in these circumstances is a long shot, at best,” in terms of entering a nation in crisis and attempting to locate and secure any so-called “loose nukes” held by rogue actors or extremists, Brian Jenkins, a senior adviser to the RAND Corp. president, said at a Wednesday presentation.

“One should not have any degree of optimism that we can do this,” he said, speaking at the Stimson Center. “This is much more complicated than, for example, going after Osama bin Laden.”

The U.S. Defense Department for years reportedly has war-gamed the possibility of forcibly securing Pakistani or North Korean nuclear warheads in the event of a serious crisis.

Both nations have maintained strict secrecy about their nuclear arms. Pakistan is estimated to have roughly 100 warheads, while North Korea might have a half-dozen or more.

Reports about the Pentagon drafting contingency plans for possible intervention in an emergency scenario have triggered outrage in Pakistan, as well as concerns elsewhere about the feasibility or wisdom of such action.

Jenkins said the need for a U.S. armed initiative in this type of scenario should not be ruled out. However, he underscored the unforeseen risks of any military intervention.

“This really gets complicated,” he said, suggesting that domestic or external armies or insurgents might pose serious obstacles. “The notion that we’re going to be operating in a benign environment is … nonsense.”

A former Army officer who served in the Green Berets, Jenkins urged the world community to think creatively about what it might do short of inserting boots on the ground.

He noted that during the Cold War, Russia and the United States agreed on hotlines and other stability measures that could be used in the event that rogue elements were to gain control of nuclear arms, despite extensive systems aimed at keeping them secure.

“It may be appropriate to start revisiting some of those things in what would be a more complex situation,” Jenkins said. “Is it realistic to think that we can -- where a weapon goes missing or there’s a situation like that -- can we actually quarantine, effectively quarantine, a nation?”

He said he was doubtful of that prospect, but suggested this idea and others nonetheless should be further explored.

“In terms of intelligence, can we rapidly mobilize a swarm of sensors and other things to try to quickly locate and track [missing items]?” he asked. “I’m talking about an all-out push.”

In the end, a lack of effective options might suggest that Washington or other world powers would be limited in the support they could provide to a nation grappling with dangerous weapons or materials on the loose, he said.

 

Analysis: Obama faces bumps with Russia policy

WASHINGTON (AP) — President Barack Obama once assured Russian leaders that he'd have more flexibility to deal with missile defense during a second term in office. But now that he has been re-elected, there's little expectation of progress on that or other contentious issues that divide the two countries.

Tensions between the United States and Russia have been rising. The countries have been at odds over Syria's civil war, Iran's nuclear program and Russia's crackdown on domestic opposition. U.S. officials are uneasy about what they see as a more assertive foreign policy by Vladimir Putin, who returned to the Russian presidency in May.

Gone is the talk of a "reset" — Obama's policy of improving relations with Moscow after they deteriorated during George W. Bush's presidency. In the few areas where Obama is seeking closer ties, such as trade, he's running into opposition from a deeply divided Congress.

Moscow is undoubtedly pleased that Obama defeated Republican Mitt Romney, who had called Russia the No. 1 foe of the United States. A Russian official said Thursday that its government expected Obama to meet his commitment to be more flexible on missile defense.

But it's hard to imagine that happening now.

"Since Putin's return to the presidency, things have become more complicated," said Cliff Kupchan, a Russia analyst with the Eurasia group, who described the current state of relations as functional, but strained.

The reset undoubtedly improved cooperation between Washington and Moscow during the early years of the Obama administration and both sides saw dividends, such as the signing of a nuclear arms control treaty and the U.S. agreeing to Russia's entry into the World Trade Organization.

During that time, tensions over missile defense had receded following Obama's early move to replace a Bush administration plan for missile defense in eastern Europe. Moscow, which had angrily charged that the Bush era plan could undermine its ability to use long-range nuclear missiles to deter attacks initially, welcomed the change. But more recently, the Kremlin has ramped up its criticism, arguing that the later stages of the Obama plan could also threaten its missiles. More

 

CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS REVELATIONS: KENNEDY'S SECRET APPROACH TO CASTRO

DECLASSIFIED RFK DOCUMENTS YIELD NEW INFORMATION ON BACK-CHANNEL TO FIDEL CASTRO TO AVOID NUCLEAR WAR

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 395

Washington, DC, October 12, 2012 – On the 50^thanniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis, new documents from the Robert Kennedy papers declassified yesterdayand posted today by the National Security Archive reveal previously unknown details of the Kennedy administration's secret effort to find an accord with Cuba that would remove the Soviet missiles in return for a modus vivendi between Washington and Havana.

The 2700 pages of RFK papers opened yesterday include the first proposed letter to "Mr. F.C.," evaluated by the Executive Committee of advisors to Kennedy on October 17^th--just one day after the president learned of the existence of the Soviet missiles in Cuba. The draft letter, available to historians for the first time, initiated a chain of events that led to a complicated back-channel diplomacy between Washington and Havana at the height of what Kennedy aide Arthur Schlesinger called "the most dangerous moment in human history."

The Archive's Cuba analyst, Peter Kornbluh, who was the first person to review the RFK papers at the Kennedy Library, noted that the documents "reinforce the key historical lesson of the missile crisis: the need and role for creative diplomacy to avoid the threat of nuclear Armageddon." Kornbluh noted that the State Department's own official historians, referring to the initial letter to Castro, had admitted that "none of these drafts have been found." The fact that the Robert Kennedy papers have yielded new information previously undiscovered by the government's own researchers, Kornbluh said, "underscores the historical importance of this declassification on the 50th anniversary of the crisis."

The Archive also posted two diagrams Robert Kennedy drew on his notepad during the crisis deliberations, including his initial tally of the "hawks" and the "doves" as Kennedy's advisors took positions on diplomacy vs. the use of force against Cuba.

The draft letter warned Castro that by deploying the ballistic missiles the Soviets had "raised grave issues for Cuba. To serve their interests they have justified the Western Hemisphere countries in making an attack on Cuba which would lead to the immediate overthrow of your regime." Moreover, according to this proposed communication, Nikita Khrushchev was quietly hinting that he would betray Cuba by trading concessions on Berlin for "Soviet abandonment of Cuba." Warning that failure to remove the missiles would lead to U.S. "measures of vital significance for the future of Cuba," the message offered an oblique carrot of negotiations for better relations once the Soviets and their weapons of mass destruction were gone.

During the early deliberations of how to respond to the missiles in Cuba Kennedy's top advisors pressed him to reject this message to Cuba because it would undermine the option of a surprise U.S. air attack on the island. After Kennedy decided on an interim option of a naval quarantine of Cuba to buy time for diplomacy to convince the Soviets to withdraw the missiles, he ordered the State Department to come up with diplomatic alternatives to attacking Cuba.

In an October 25 memorandum, titled "Political Path," the State Department submitted a series of creative options for resolving the crisis peacefully, including allowing the United Nations to take control of both the Soviet missile bases in Cuba and the U.S. missile bases in Turkey. The document also provided an outline for an "approach to Castro" through Brazil, with a message to Castro underscoring his options: "the overthrow of his regime, if not its physical destruction," or "assurances, regardless of whether we intended to carry them out, that we would not ourselves undertake to overthrow the regime" if he expelled both the missiles and the Russians. More

 

 

Belfer Center, Foreign Policy launch contest on Cuban Missile Crisis lessons

For the 50th anniversary of what historians agree was the most dangerous moment in human history, Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Foreign Policy magazine today launched a contest for scholars and citizens to reflect on the lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis and its lessons for current challenges.

The contest is straightforward: In no more than 300 words, entrants must present the most persuasive, original lesson flowing from the confrontation that brought the world to the brink of nuclear war over 13 days in October 1962. The rules of the contest and additional details are available here. Prizes will be awarded to the winner in each of three categories: general public; foreign policy scholars/practitioners; and students in grades 6-12. Entries will be accepted through October 10. Winners will be announced October 15. The three winners will each receive an iPad.

The Belfer Center has created a Cuban Missile Crisis website to mark the 50th anniversary. The site offers original documents, video clips and an interactive timeline. In addition, the “lessons” section provides tools for teachers, including draft lesson plans, to help engage students in thinking about the modern-day implications of the nuclear showdown half a century ago.

Foreign Policy magazine also has innovative content on the crisis, including an “On the Brink” Twitter feed by author and historian Michael Dobbs that provides daily Tweets echoing events 50 years ago as the standoff developed. More

 

Illusion Of Missile Defence

The Defense Research and Development Organization DRDO has chosen Delhi and Mumbai, the two vital cities of India, for the ballistic missile sheet. This BMD system will be able to soot down the enemy’s missiles in both within the Earth’s atmosphere and outside it. This decision will be materialized after getting the final approval from the Defense Committee of the Cabinet (DCC), the highest decision making body regarding the defense and security in India . The introduction of BMD to the South Asian security environment will result into the deterrence instability, crisis instability arm race instabilities and will jeopardize the prospects of arms control and disarmament in the region.

India has been embarked aggressively upon the development of BMD system since 2006,however, origin of India’s plan for missile defense, dates back to the early 1980s, when it started its Integrated Missile Development Program (IGDMP).IGDMP consisted of panoply of offensive and defensive missile plate forms such as Pritvi, Agni and Akash. As it is conceived from media the Indian BMD system revolves around the variants of Pritvi and Akash missiles. According to the Indian official sources DRDO used the Pritvi missile as simulated targets. The finally ready version, as per the Indian sources, has the capability to destroy an incoming missile with the range of almost 2000 km.

Technically, BMD system as a concept embodies two distinct but inter-related facets: Theatre Missile Defense (TMD) and National Missile Defense (NMD). The former envisions deploying of a defensive system to protect the military forces at battle field. Such system is usually precise, mobile and quickly deployable across the diverse geographic environments. While the later, in contrast to the former, envisions protecting the population, command centers and vital industrial complexes against the sea and ground based ballistic missiles of enemy.

As the DRDO has signaled out that the ballistic missile defense shield will be deployed around the Mumbai and Delhi in the first phase, which will be extended to the other major cities of India in the next phases, we can easily adjust the Indian BMD system in the NMD category.

Intercepting an incoming missile is like to hit an incoming bullet with a bullet. According to the experts of missile defense the missile interception is an extremely difficult feat even under the perfect testing conditions. But the task would have to be accomplished in an environment for which there has been no actual experience. Since there has not been any real nuclear war between nuclear weapon states, so predicting about the environmental effects on the reliability and efficiency of interceptors in a nuclear exchange would be a futile practice. More

 

Indian nuclear forces, 2012 - Bulletin of Atomic Scientists

Abstract

In April 2012, India successfully test-launched the Agni V ballistic missile—and though the missile needs more testing and is still several years away from operational deployment, the Agni V introduces a new dynamic to the already complex triangular security relationship among India, Pakistan, and China. India is estimated to have produced approximately 520 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium, sufficient for 100–130 nuclear warheads; however, not all of the material has been converted into warheads. Based on available information about its nuclear-capable delivery vehicles, the authors estimate that India has produced 80–100 nuclear warheads. In this article, the authors explore how the country will need even more warheads to arm the new missiles it is currently developing.

India’s drive to develop a nuclear triad proceeds apace, with New Delhi developing or deploying several weapon systems to realize its goal of achieving offensive nuclear forces on land, at sea, and in the air. India took a significant step forward with the successful test-launch of the Agni V ballistic missile on April 19, 2012. With a range reportedly greater than 5,000 kilometers (3,107 miles), the Agni V can reach any target in China; however, the missile needs more testing and is still several years away from operational deployment. Nevertheless, the Agni V introduces a new dynamic to the already complex triangular security relationship among India, Pakistan, and China; a week after India’s April test-launch, Pakistan (somewhat predictably) responded by test-firing its nuclear-capable Shaheen-1A medium-range ballistic missile.

India is estimated to have produced approximately 520 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium (IPFM, 2011), sufficient for 100–130 nuclear warheads; however, not all of the material has been converted into warheads. Based on available information about its nuclear-capable delivery vehicles, we estimate that India has produced 80–100 nuclear warheads. It will need more warheads to arm the new missiles it is currently developing. In addition to the Dhruva plutonium production reactor near Mumbai, India plans to construct a second reactor near Visakhapatnam, on the east coast. India is building an unsafeguarded prototype fast-breeder reactor at the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research near Kalpakkam (about 1,000 kilometers or 620 miles south of Visakhapatnam), which will significantly increase India’s plutonium production capacity once it becomes operational. More