Reality of National Security State Trumps 'Delusions' of U.S. Democracy

In the halls of U.S. government, "policy in the national security realm is made by the concealed institutions," political scientist argues in new book

"I think the American people are deluded."

So says Tufts University political scientist Michael J. Glennon, whose new book, National Security and Double Government (Oxford University Press), describes a powerful bureaucratic network that's really pulling the strings on key aspects of U.S. foreign policy.

The 'double government' explains why the Obama version of national security is virtually indistinguishable from the one he inherited from President George W. Bush.

The American public believes "that when they vote for a president or member of Congress or succeed in bringing a case before the courts, that policy is going to change," Glennon told the Boston Globe in an interview published Sunday. "Now, there are many counter-examples in which these branches do affect policy... But the larger picture is still true—policy by and large in the national security realm is made by the concealed institutions."

Glennon argues that because managers of the military, intelligence, diplomatic, and law enforcement agencies operate largely outside the institutions meant to check or constrain them—the executive branch, the courts, Congress—national security policy changes very little from one administration to the next.

This explains, he says, why the Obama version of national security is virtually indistinguishable from the one he inherited from President George W. Bush. It's also why Guantanamo is still open; why whistleblowers are being prosecuted more; why NSA surveillance has expanded; why drone strikes have increased.

"I was curious why a president such as Barack Obama would embrace the very same national security and counterterrorism policies that he campaigned eloquently against," Glennon said. Drawing on his own personal experiences as former legal counsel to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, as well as conversations with dozens of individuals in U.S. military, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies and elected officials, Glennon drew the following conclusion: "National security policy actually bubbles up from within the bureaucracy. Many of the more controversial policies, from the mining of Nicaragua’s harbors to the NSA surveillance program, originated within the bureaucracy."

To dismantle this so-called "double government"—a phrase coined by British journalist and businessman Walter Bagehot to describe the British government in the 1860s—will be a challenge, Glennon admits. After all, "There is very little profit to be had in learning about, and being active about, problems that you can’t affect, policies that you can’t change."

But he is not hopeless. "The ultimate problem is the pervasive political ignorance on the part of the American people. And indifference to the threat that is emerging from these concealed institutions. That is where the energy for reform has to come from: the American people," he said. "The people have to take the bull by the horns." More

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I'd Dump the Israelis Tomorrow -Ex-CIA Michael Scheuer Tells Congress

I'd Dump the Israelis Tomorrow -Ex-CIA Michael Scheuer Tells Congress House Homeland Security Committee on October 9, 2013

© 2014

Pentagon to wage worldwide war on terror for decades to come

After the attacks of September 11, Congress handed over the power to the Executive Branch to declare war. The Authorization to Use Military Force Act empowers the president to fight the 'War on Terror' anywhere on the global and is set for repeal. On Thursday, the Senate held a hearing over the 12 year-old legislation, but will this legislation remain unchanged or will Congress regain the authority? To discuss, RT's Sam Sacks gives us his take on the AUMF.
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Defense in an Age of Austerity

Unless the U.S. Congress and the Obama administration avert the mandated sequestration of $1.2 trillion from the discretionary accounts of the federal budget, then severe cuts of nearly equal amounts will be imposed on U.S. defense and domestic programs beginning in March 2013.

In other words, if and when this sequestration occurs, the U.S. defense budget will be reduced by some $500 billion beyond the $487 billion in cuts already programmed over the next decade by the U.S. Department of Defense.

Where might the department find these savings? Some could and should be found by introducing further efficiencies, reforming acquisition practices, and adjusting personnel compensation packages. But these steps alone would not yield savings of the magnitude that might be required.

Reductions of the magnitude implied by sequestration should not be made without a reexamination of the current U.S. defense strategy. The department would no longer be able to afford the suite of capabilities envisioned by U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta in his strategic guidance issued in January 2012. Although making across-the-board cuts or eliminating programs that offer prompt savings would be tempting options, they would yield an unbalanced force in the short term and potentially higher program costs in future years.

Reductions of the magnitude implied by sequestration should not be made without a reexamination of the current U.S. defense strategy.

The prudent approach would be to decide first on a strategic direction, clarifying which forces and equipment the United States should preserve as priorities and which could be cut back or eliminated. Establishing a strategic direction prior to such reductions would limit the risk they might impose or, at the very least, make that risk explicit to U.S. leaders. This effort would entail prioritization of the defense challenges and of what risks to accept, with program and budget decisions following.

While not advocating further defense cuts, we offer three alternative ways to cut roughly $400–$500 billion more from U.S. defense programs over the next decade without crippling the force. At the upper end, this amount reaches the level of cuts suggested by the sequestration mandate. Each alternative strategic direction is summarized below, outlining the force reductions and other programmatic cuts that would be necessary to achieve the targeted savings. To further illuminate the dialogue that can and should take place, we make explicit the risks that would be incurred by following one or another of the alternative strategic directions. These alternatives are not mutually exclusive, and combinations of features of each are possible.

Alternative I

Prepare for Persistent Land-Based Conflict

Projected Savings, Fiscal Years 2014–2023: $488–$523 billion

This option assumes that violent extremism and related insurgencies will outlast efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan and remain a serious threat to the United States and its interests — first and foremost, the protection of its citizenry. Therefore, readiness to respond to that threat must remain a top U.S. defense priority. This alternative retains the capability to commit sizable U.S. land forces for counterinsurgency and stabilization operations. Ground forces would not be scaled back beyond the reductions outlined by Panetta in January 2012. However, aviation and maritime forces would be drawn down further than currently planned. More