North Korean leader, in rare address, seeks end to confrontation with South

SEOUL | Mon Dec 31, 2012 (Reuters) - North Korean leader Kim Jong-un called for an end to confrontation between the two Koreas, technically still at war in the absence of a peace treaty to end their 1950-53 conflict, in a surprise New Year speech broadcast on state media.

The address by Kim, who took over power in the reclusive state after his father, Kim Jong-il, died in 2011, appeared to take the place of the policy-setting New Year editorial published in leading state newspapers.

Impoverished North Korea raised tensions in the region by launching a long-range rocket in December that it said was aimed at putting a scientific satellite in orbit, drawing international condemnation.

North Korea, which considers North and South as one country, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, is banned from testing missile or nuclear technology under U.N. sanctions imposed after its 2006 and 2009 nuclear weapons tests.

"An important issue in putting an end to the division of the country and achieving its reunification is to remove confrontation between the north and the south," Kim said in the address that appeared to be pre-recorded and was made at an undisclosed location.

"The past records of inter-Korean relations show that confrontation between fellow countrymen leads to nothing but war."

The New Year address was the first in 19 years by a North Korean leader after the death of Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-un's grandfather. Kim Jong-il rarely spoke in public and disclosed his national policy agenda in editorials in state newspapers. More

 

UK High Court rejects inquiry into British role in Pakistan drone strikes

On December 21, the High Court in London rejected a request for a judicial inquiry into the alleged role of the UK’s Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) spying operation in aiding drone strikes by the US in Pakistan’s northwest region.

The case was brought by Noor Khan, a Pakistani man whose father was killed, along with 49 other people, by a US drone attack on March 17, 2011. Khan’s father, Malik Daud Khan, was chairing a peaceful jirga (tribal assembly) meeting to discuss chromite mining rights in North Waziristan when he was killed by several missile strikes.

In his legal submission, Khan asked the court to look into whether UK intelligence officials provided assistance in the killing of his father and if they are liable for prosecution under British law.

The revealing 15-page ruling by Lord Justice Moses and supported by Mr Justice Simon came down blatantly in favour of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. In essence, it serves as the legal justification for ensuring that the UK’s role in assisting the US to carry out its murderous drone operations never sees the light of day. As with every ruling designed to conceal the nefarious and illegal activities of the ruling elite, it is cloaked in the guise that to require the UK government to reveal such information would jeopardise “national security”.

Citing evidence given to the court from the Foreign Office, the ruling states “that if the Secretary of State were required to make a substantive response to the claim, the likely consequence would be serious harm to national security and international relations. The United Kingdom Government would be compelled to express a definitive view on legal issues, complicating and damaging relations with our most important bilateral ally and, in consequence, damaging the United Kingdom’s security.”

The ruling refused permission for Khan’s claim, stating that “the real aim and target of these proceedings is not to inform GCHQ employees that if they were prosecuted, no defence of combatant immunity would be available. The real aim is to persuade this court to make a public pronouncement designed to condemn the activities of the United States in North Waziristan, as a step in persuading them to halt such activity.”

The ruling also took note of legal proceedings that Khan has undertaken in Pakistan, in order to reiterate that under no conditions would the UK High Court make a ruling condemning the drone attacks or the GCHQ’s alleged role in these. Referring to Khan’s plea to the Court in Peshawar, Moses writes, “[H]e contends that the Government of Pakistan, and various Ministries, are under a constitutional obligation to take all necessary action to stop ‘illegal drone strikes’ and ‘safeguard its citizens from target killing by an external force’. He pleads that ‘the act of killing of innocent people on March 17 2011 was extra-judicial killing, more generally referred to as murder’. The prayer refers to criminal offences by those inside and outside Pakistan in drone operations.” More

 

Living under drones

http://www.warcosts.com
Since 2004, up to 884 innocent civilians, including at least 176 children, have died from US drone strikes in the North Waziristan region of Pakistan. A new report from the Stanford and New York University law schools finds drone use has caused widespread post-tramatic stress disorder and an overall breakdown of functional society in North Waziristan. In addition, the report finds the use of a "double tap" procedure, in which a drone strikes once and strikes again not long after, has led to deaths of rescuers and medical professionals. Many interviewees told the researchers they didn't know what America was before drones. Now what they know of America is drones, death and terror. Follow the conversation @WarCosts #UnderDrones


 

Living under drones

http://www.warcosts.com
Since 2004, up to 884 innocent civilians, including at least 176 children, have died from US drone strikes in the North Waziristan region of Pakistan. A new report from the Stanford and New York University law schools finds drone use has caused widespread post-tramatic stress disorder and an overall breakdown of functional society in North Waziristan. In addition, the report finds the use of a "double tap" procedure, in which a drone strikes once and strikes again not long after, has led to deaths of rescuers and medical professionals. Many interviewees told the researchers they didn't know what America was before drones. Now what they know of America is drones, death and terror. Follow the conversation @WarCosts #UnderDrones

Obama and the Kurdish Question: Drones Are Not the Answer

The role of the Obama administration in suppressing the long-running Kurdish uprising in Turkey is largely unknown.

But a few weeks ago a U.S. diplomat dropped an intriguing clue. Francis J. Ricciardone, Jr., Obama's ambassador to Turkey, revealed that the U.S. had secretly offered Turkey what was, in effect, a bin Laden-style assassination of the top leadership of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party), the rebels who have been fighting the U.S.-equipped Turkish army since 1984.

"Your enemies are our enemies," Ricciardone told Turkish reporters at a news conference in Ankara. "The power of the multidisciplinary approach is what got bin Laden in the end, and we would like to share that and exploit that intimately."

When I heard the ambassador's remarks, I had just left Syria, where a different Kurdish group is struggling for its own autonomy. I was en route at the time to Mt. Qandhil, one of the highest mountains in neighboring Iraq, where PKK rebels have a sanctuary. I was seeking reaction to news that Turkey was quietly negotiating with Abdullah Ocalan, the notorious PKK founder who was captured in 1999 with U.S. assistance, and who since then, has become a cause célèbre with many Kurds in the Middle East.

The 28-year-old Kurdish uprising in Turkey has resulted in 40,000 deaths, most of them Kurds. The U.S. considers the PKK a terrorist group, but experts say both the rebels and Turkish troops have committed human rights abuses. Today, the struggle goes beyond military conflict. Since 2009, some 8,000 Kurdish civilians have been arrested in Turkey. That includes lawyers and at least 100 journalists -- more than in Iran or China.

This fall, some 700-1,000 prisoners went on hunger strike in Turkey, demanding that Ocalan be removed from solitary confinement and that Kurds receive broadcasting rights, education in their native tongue and ethnic recognition in the Turkish constitution. Turkey claims that most of the prisoners have ties to the PKK, but according to Human Rights Watch, many Kurds were arrested in a "crackdown on legal pro-Kurdish politics."

Against this backdrop came Ambassador Ricciardone's startling disclosure: the administration's misguided proposal to target the Kurdish rebel leadership. In fact, the PKK is not al-Qaeda, nor has it targeted Americans -- and Turkey wisely rejected the U.S. offer. "Bin Laden was caught in a house," Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan sought to explain diplomatically, "but the struggle here is in mountainous geography."

After rebuffing the assassination proposal, Turkey successfully negotiated an end to the vexing hunger strike, which had garnered considerable support in southeast Turkey, where most of the country's 15 million Kurds reside. Had the cockamamie scheme succeeded, the killings would likely have turned Kurdish public opinion against the U.S. and given the rebels a powerful recruiting tool. More

 

PhD in energy security at Central European University

Central European University (CEU, www.ceu.hu) welcomes applicants for a PhD position in the area of energy security and future energy systems.

A successful candidate will work under the supervision of Prof. Aleh Cherp to pursue the Doctor of Philosophy degree at the Department of Environmental Sciences and Policy.

The research agenda will be developed to match the candidate’s interests and capacities and to advance policy-relevant knowledge on present and future national and global energy security challenges including under sustainable energy transitions. It will built on the recently completed Global Energy Assessment, where Professor Cherp led the analysis of energy security. Of particular interests might be such topics as energy security assessments and policies, and the relationship between global energy scenarios and national energy realities. These issues may be studied with respect to entire energy systems or particular energy sectors.
CEU provides a full tuition waiver as well as a living stipend for all PhD students. Research and travel grants as well as support for a “study abroad” year are also provided to good doctoral students. In addition, many PhD students participate in international research projects with CEU faculty.

A candidate for this position must hold a Masters degree relevant to Energy or Environmental studies from a good university of international standing. He or she should have demonstrated academic excellence as well as passion for research and commitment to academic success. Good writing abilities as well as advanced computer and quantitative analytical skills are an advantage.

Central European University is an English-language graduate institution founded by George Soros in 1991. It is accredited in both the United States and Hungary, and offers English-language Master's and doctoral programs. Located in the heart of Central Europe -- Budapest, Hungary -- CEU has developed a distinct academic and intellectual focus, combining the comparative study of the region's historical, cultural, and social contexts with a global perspective on good governance, sustainable development and social transformation. As part of its educational, research, and civic engagement activities, CEU attaches particular importance to scholarship relevant to public policy.

Inquiries about the position can be made to Prof Cherp while applications can be submitted online (http://www.ceu.hu/admissions/apply) by January 24th, 2013.
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Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan Was Not a Grand Design

Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan Was Not a Grand Design But a Grand Entanglement Resulting from Faulty Intelligence, Excessive Secrecy, and a Paralyzed Leadership, According to Conference of Former Decision-Makers

Proceedings from 1995 Conference Reveal Soviet Motivations and U.S. Internal Reactions to Soviet Move

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 409
Posted - December 21, 2012

Edited by Malcolm Byrne and Svetlana Savranskaya

For more information contact:
202/994-7000 or nsarchiv@gwu.edu

http://www.nsarchive.org

Washington, D.C., December 12, 2012 -- On December 12, 1979, the Soviet Politburo gathered to formally approve the decision made several days earlier to send a "limited contingent" of Soviet forces into Afghanistan. The secrecy was so tight that the leadership hand-wrote the authorization document in one copy and hand-carried it to each Politburo member for signature. The order does not even mention Afghanistan by name and uses cryptic language to entrust Andropov, Ustinov and Gromyko to oversee the implementation of the decision. The Yeltsin government declassified the one-page record in 1992 as part of a body of evidence for use at the upcoming trial of the Communist Party.

Ever since December 1979, the war has continued to ravage the country, and scholars and politicians continue to try to come to grips with what went wrong at each stage. Today, the National Security Archive publishes materials from the final conference of the Carter-Brezhnev Project, hosted by the Norwegian Nobel Institute at the Lysebu conference center outside Oslo, a meeting that produced major insights into Soviet decision-making on the eve of the invasion and the U.S. response to it.

According to the full transcript of the Lysebu sessions, the Soviets were concerned with Afghan leader Hafizullah Amin's perceived turn to the West, his ruthless purges of opponents in the Afghan communist party and government, and the possibility of a U.S. grand plan for the Middle East reaching to the Soviets' southern borders. The Kremlin reluctantly approved a limited invasion plan only after a strong push from Yuri Andropov's KGB intending to bring Amin rival Babrak Karmal to power, help secure his regime for its first months in power, and then leave the country. The Politburo's intelligence was badly flawed, however, exaggerating both the danger of U.S. interference and the ease of changing the regime. (For more Soviet documents and analysis, see the Archive's Russian page, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/rus/Afganistan.html)

Check out today's posting at the National Security Archive website -http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB409/

Find us on Facebook - http://www.facebook.com/NSArchive

Unredacted, the Archive blog - http://nsarchive.wordpress.com/


________________________________________________________
THE NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE is an independent non-governmental research institute and library located at The George Washington University in Washington, D.C. The Archive collects and publishes declassified documents acquired through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). A tax-exempt public charity, the Archive receives no U.S. government funding; its budget is supported by publication royalties and donations from foundations and individuals.


 

UK Energy Research Centre Summer School 2013 nominations now open

The UK Energy Research Centre (UKERC) is holding its ninth annual Energy Summer School from 7-12th July 2013 at the University of Warwick in the English Midlands. There will be 100 places available for UK and international students.

The School has been specifically designed to give second year PhD students an opportunity to look beyond their own research and develop an understanding of energy systems as a whole and pathways to low-carbon and resilient energy systems. We welcome applications from those engaged in energy-related research including technical, physical, social, economic, environmental and business aspects of energy and energy systems.

We would like to invite you to nominate students to attend. There is no charge for registered research students to attend the School; UKERC will provide accommodation and all meals and materials for activities. The School is conducted in English, and as it is highly interactive a good standard of comprehension and spoken English is essential.

Agenda

During the week-long School, which runs in parallel to UKERC’s Annual Assembly, students will:
Understand the global commercial, political, innovation and technological challenges in the transition to a low-carbon system;
Be involved in high level debate on energy technologies and research priorities in a number of key research areas, from demand reduction to future sources of energy;
Be presented with a number of contrasting international perspectives on energy;
Have the opportunity to network with key academic, and energy research contacts;
Research, develop, negotiate and agree a collective vision for a low-carbon energy system with the opportunity to apply your current research and present the work to the UK Energy Research Centre
Develop and practice professional skills in communication and engagement.

The School is professionally facilitated to provide continual support for participants, and includes a number of networking opportunities as well as social events.

Successful applicants will be notified by e-mail from 25th March 2013 and both nominator and nominee will at that time be asked to formally accept the place. Should the delegate subsequently withdraw and a suitable replacement not be found, the nominator will be required to pay for the cost of the unused place. The School is normally heavily over-subscribed, and UKERC will select delegates by giving preference to those in the second year of a PhD, to provide an appropriate mix of specialist disciplines, and a balance of UK and non-UK based students.

Nominations are now open until midnight GMT on the 17th March 2013. For convenience we ask that the student completes the nomination form, but they will need to include your details as confirmation of supervisor endorsement.

The nomination form can be accessed from our website or by clicking on the link below.

http://www.regonline.co.uk/ukercsummerschool2013


 

Iran special analysis: Breaking the deadlock in the nuclear negotiations

Nicholas J. Wheeler, Josh Baker, and Scott Lucas of the University of Birmingham write:

Following the recent re-election of President Obama, attention has turned yet again to the prospect of new negotiations between the P5+1 (United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, and China) and Iran. Whilst there have been indications that Iran wished to restart talks since the previous round of discussions ended in June 2012, the Western powers, led by the United States, wanted to delay talks until after the US elections. Now that this hurdle has been cleared and President Obama has been returned for a second term, speculation has centred on whether the administration might come forward with a more imaginative set of proposals that could break the negotiating stalemate which characterised the first term. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton has recently put forward that possibility. Speaking on November 30th, she claimed that ‘we [the United States] continue to believe that there is still a window of opportunity to reach some kind of resolution over Iran's nuclear program…the fact that we finished our election…would be a good time to test the proposition that there can be some good-faith serious negotiations’.

In theory, Clinton might be right. As the historian John Lewis Gaddis has argued, ‘second terms in the White House open the way for second thoughts’ as they ‘lessen…the influence of domestic political considerations’. Second terms, then, might provide the necessary political space to make the moves it takes to transform deep-rooted conflicts. The most notable example being Ronald Reagan’s road to Damascus type conversion on the wisdom of negotiating with the Soviet Union. This was significantly influenced by his growing fears of nuclear war which came to a head with the Able Archer crisis of 1983. Reagan’s decision to enter into negotiations with Moscow bore fruit when he found in Mikhail Gorbachev, who became the leader of the Soviet Union in March 1985, an interlocutor whom he could trust, leading to aremarkable transformation of US-Soviet relations in the second half of the 1980s. A key factor facilitating this transformation was the sweeping mandate that Reagan secured through his overwhelming election victory. This example raises the question as to whether Obama’s victory - though not as sweeping as Reagan’s - might create a new-found political space within which to make moves which could similarly transform US-Iranian nuclear relations. However, there is an important dimension - and difference - to be noted in the past and present. In 1985, the initiative to end the Cold War came from Gorbachev with his game-changing proposals. Rather than trying to exploit Soviet gestures to weaken the Soviet Union, the Reagan Administration worked with Gorbachev to advance arms control agreements that promoted mutual security.

In December 2012, we are at a stage of negotiations where each side is looking to the other to make a decisive game-changing move. From Tehran's point of view, Iran has already made a number of significant gestures in recent months, most notably the offer to suspend enrichment of 20 per cent Uranium in return for equally calibrated reductions in sanctions. At the same time, it has arguably made a further concession by increasing the level of conversion of its existing stockpile of 20 per cent enriched uranium into fuel plates for its Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) to reassure Western concerns about its nuclear break-out capability. The Iranian leadership believes that the promised concession on the 20 per cent and the actual step of converting half of its stock has not been met with any equivalent reciprocation by the United States and its key allies.

In a classic example of each side failing to understand the other’s position, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France have not interpreted these Iranian moves as conciliatory ones. Consequently, the Western powers are looking to Tehran to make a significant first move in breaking the negotiating impasse when Tehran believes it has already done this. What the Western powers are seeking as an Iranian opening move is the so-called ‘stop, ship, and shut’ policy (freezing 20 per cent production, shipping the existing stockpile of 20 per cent out of the country, and closing the Fordoo plant). They have said that were this to happen, they would then consider reciprocation, including the distant possibility of limited sanctions relief. Such an opening gambit has been interpreted in Tehran as a demand for unilateral concessions dressed up in the garb of the language of reciprocity. Indeed, former Iranian nuclear negotiator, Hossein Mousavian, likened the Western strategy to one of‘peanuts for diamonds.’ More




 

Statement by President Clinton at 1996 Adoptation of CTBT

On the day the CTBT was born.

The William Clinton Presidential Library recently uploaded a short video to its Youtube channel featuring the first statement by former U.S. President Clinton after the UN General Assembly resoundingly adopted the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty on 10 September 1996 after more than two years of negotiations.

Untitled

Today, Stimson is releasing an essay by Michael Krepon on “Pakistan’s Nuclear Strategy and Deterrence Stability.” Krepon argues that it will be hard to dampen the growth of Pakistan’s considerable and growing nuclear arsenal because few individuals make these decisions and most Pakistanis view them as a rare success story. They begrudge governmental corruption and incompetence, but not money spent on the Bomb.

Acknowledging that the particulars of Rawalpindi’s targeting objectives are closely held, the author offers the speculative conclusion that Pakistan's requirements for nuclear weapons reflect a low-, medium- and high-end mix of targeting objectives. The low option may reflect selective or demonstrative use of tactical nuclear weapons. The medium option may possibly entail widespread use of tactical nuclear weapons, although this cannot yet be determined. The high-end option may entail the destruction of critical infrastructure, leadership-related targets, and cities, with the overarching objective to deny India victory in large-scale exchanges and to destroy India as a functioning society.

A small circle of military officers determine Pakistan’s stockpile and targeting requirements, including one retired officer, Lt. General Khalid Kidwai, Director-General of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division since its inception in 2000. Gen. Kidwai’s extended tenure makes his views particularly influential.

This essay concludes by discussing the implications of ongoing nuclear modernization programs for deterrence stability in South Asia. Pakistani and Indian nuclear weapon programs have diversified and grown, with both countries now possessing capabilities that did not figure in previous crises, including tactical nuclear weapons and cruise missiles. In addition, sea-based nuclear capabilities appear likely. All of these developments raise new challenges for command and control.

What would it take to alter Pakistan’s current growth trajectory in nuclear weapon-related capabilities? Among Krepon's list of possibilities are a different orientation toward India by Pakistan’s military leaders, severe perturbations in Pakistan’s economy, and a perception-shattering event that causes nuclear advocates to re-think their assumptions. He argues that the safest route to reducing nuclear dangers remains patient, persistent, top-down efforts to normalize relations between Pakistan and India. Success in this pursuit is dependent on the recognition by Pakistan’s military leaders that they possess a sufficient arsenal to secure their objectives, that their current path does not strengthen or stabilize deterrence, and that Indian leaders seek a properly functioning Pakistan more than a submissive one.

Stimson’s analytical and prescriptive assessments on the nuclear competition in South Asia are funded by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and by the National Nuclear Security Administration. To access the full essay, please click here.

 

Climate Change and Development short course

Climate Change and Development Short Course

International Development UEA, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK

2 week residential course

Dates

September 4-17 2013

Places

20

Fee

£3200

Language

The course is conducted in English. Full competence in English, written and spoken is an essential requirement.

Target audience

The course is designed for professionals who want to gain a greater understanding of the implications of climate change for developing countries and of the processes, issues and debates surrounding adaptation and mitigation. It is aimed at building the knowledge base of staff from government agencies and NGOs who do not have an existing specialism in the field but who may have new responsibility or interest in the integration of climate change management into development planning, projects and policy.

"Exceptionally well organised and well delivered course. Well done Roger (Dr Roger Few, Course Director) and his team of experts. A big thank you!"

2011 participant from UK Commonwealth Secretariat

Location

International Development UEA, university of East Anglia, Norwich, UK

Contact devco.train@uea.ac.uk for all further information

download a pdf of the course brochure

Apply for this course

Climate change has profound implications for developing countries and increasingly, professionals working in or for developing countries are being asked to integrate climate change management into planning, projects and policy. National governments are also engaged in official communications to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and other initiatives which require analysis of vulnerability and adaptive capacity.

Objectives

The purpose of this short course it to equip non-specialists with a broad understanding of what climate change may mean for low-income populations. It will examine the scope and prospects for adapting to change and contributing to emissions reduction in the context of development issues and property reduction. The course does not set out to provide a practical ‘toolkit' guide for policy and practice. Instead it is designed to equip participants with a deeper awareness of the ideas, opportunities and trade-offs represented by adaptation and mitigation; an awareness that is increasingly needed if effective action on climate change is to be achieved. Participants have the opportunity to gain state-of-the-art knowledge and to develop their analytical skills in this field.

Course content and structure

Participants will gain grounding in a broad range of climate change issues from the underlying science of climate change, through its implications for development pathways to the international political agenda of climate change mitigation and adaptation.

Key emphasis is then placed on vulnerability and adaption in the context of poverty reduction – exploring what climate change implies in terms of impacts and vulnerability in developing countries and how to go about building resilience and adaptive capacity at all scales.

Expert inputs will include:

• Climate science
• International policy and implementation mechanisms
• Impacts and vulnerability in the context of development
• Adaptation and resilience: examples and lessons from different sectors
• Mitigation and development pathways
• Linkages with poverty reduction

The course is structured to encourage participants to share their ideas through interactive and small-group work. During the course, participants will also be expected to work on the preparation and presentation of a project related to their country context or specific professional sector. This will ensure the knowledge and insight gained from the course is immediately grounded in the work that has practical relevance for the participant.

Course Director

Course Director Dr Roger Few is Senior Research Fellow in the School of International Development, UEA and a Researcher with the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research. He has a background in human geography, political ecology and environment and health in developing countries. His research focuses on vulnerability and adaptation to natural hazards/disasters and climate change, with special interest in how households, communities and institutions respond to the health risks associated with extreme weather events and climatic changes. For this short course Roger draws together expertise from some of the world's leading research institutes on climate change such as the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research. the School of International Development and the School of Environmental Sciences at the University of East Anglia (UEA).

Recent contributors include:

Professor Neil Adger, Professor Kevin Anderson, Dr Nick Brooks, Professor Kate Brown, Professor Declan Conway, Dr Roger Few, Dr Marisa Goulden, Professor Bruce Lankford, Professor Corinne Le Quéré, Professor Peter Newell and Dr Heike Schroeder.

Apply for this course

International Development UEA, university of East Anglia, Norwich, UK

Contact devco.train@uea.ac.uk for all further information

Skills Development and Training Office

International Development UEA

School of International Development

University of East Anglia

Norwich NR4 7TJ

Tel: +44 (0)1603 592340

Fax: +44 (0)1603 591170

More

 

This Drone Notion Is Starting to Get Serious

It was only two days ago that Battleland posted a photo of the Navy’s X-47B Unmanned Combat Aircraft System demonstrator “landing” gently on the flight deck of the USS Harry S Truman – with help from a crane.

Meanwhile, back on land, this video of a second Northrop Grumman aircraft shows its first-ever catapult launch Thursday at the Navy test center at Pax River, Md. That’s a steam-powered kick-in-the-pants to power a warplane off a relatively short carrier deck.

It’s something drones will have to do if they’re ever to play a key role in naval aviation (the new Ford class of carriers is planning to use electromagnetic power instead of steam to deliver the kick).

Unlike most earlier drones, with their piddling engines and propellers, the jet-powered X-47B looks – and sounds, thanks to its Pratt & Whitney F-16 engine – like a real warplane. More

 

 

 

For the First Time, Obama Official Sketches Out End to War on Terror

Neither the George W. Bush nor Barack Obama White House ever laid out a vision for what an end to the war on terrorism would actually look like. But as Obama prepares for his second term in office, one of his top defense officials is arguing that there is an end in sight, and laying out conditions for when the U.S. will reach it.

Jeh Johnson

“On the present course, there will come a tipping point,” Jeh Johnson, the Pentagon’s top lawyer, told the Oxford Union in the U.K. on Friday, “a tipping point at which so many of the leaders and operatives of al-Qaida and its affiliates have been killed or captured, and the group is no longer able to attempt or launch a strategic attack against the United States, such that al-Qaida as we know it, the organization that our Congress authorized the military to pursue in 2001, has been effectively destroyed.” At that point, “our efforts should no longer be considered an armed conflict.”

Johnson’s description of the endgame raises more questions than answers. But under his formulation, the 2001 Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF), which the Obama administration has cited as the foundation of its wartime powers, would expire. That would mean any detainee at Guantanamo Bay who hasn’t been charged with a crime would be free to go, although Johnson says that wouldn’t necessarily happen immediately. It would also raise questions about whether the U.S. would possess residual legal authorities for its lethal drone program — which Johnson defended to the BBC on Thursday — including the legal basis for any “postwar” drone strike the CIA might perform.

In Johnson’s view, once al-Qaida’s ability to launch a strategic attack is gone, so too is the war. What will remain is a “counterterrorism effort” against the “individuals who are the scattered remnants” of the organization or even unaffiliated terrorists. “The law enforcement and intelligence resources of our government are principally responsible” for dealing with them, Johnson said, according to the text of his speech, with “military assets in reserve” for an imminent threat.

Johnson, considered one of the more liberal voices on Obama’s senior national security team, notably did not say when the U.S. will reach his tipping point. And his vague argument is more likely to provoke debate than settle any legal or strategic questions about the war. But it comes at an auspicious time: just before Obama’s second term, when there are visible stirrings in Congress to finally close Guantanamo Bay and accelerate an end to the Afghanistan war. Johnson, according to Foreign Policy’s Kevin Baron, is also under consideration to become attorney general, a post from which he’d have greater influence to conclude the war. It’s also notable that Johnson’s current boss, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, recently backed away from his earlier rhetoric that the war is abating and heralded its spread to new battlefields in Africa.

Johnson’s not a commander. He’s the Pentagon’s general counsel, meaning his most direct involvement in the war on terrorism surrounds the military’s ability to detain suspected terrorists during the conflict. In his view, once the conflict ends, Guantanamo Bays doors have to swing open. Just maybe not immediately.

“In general, the military’s authority to detain ends with the ‘cessation of active hostilities’,” Johnson said. But he pointedly noted that both the U.S. and U.K. governments “delayed the release of some Nazi German prisoners of war” after World War II ended. Still, that would mean the vast majority of Guantanamo’s 166 detainees, those who haven’t been charged with any crime, would be ultimately free to go — a position almost guaranteed to spark controversy.

Murkier still is what it would mean for intelligence and law enforcement to target the “scattered remnants” of al-Qaida. Most significantly, once the AUMF expires, big questions would immediately arise about the legal framework for the apparatus of drone strikes and commando raids that President Obama hasexpanded and institutionalized for the long haul. The CIA in particular is a question mark: since the legal rationale for its drone program has never been disclosed, its dependency on the AUMF or its typical “Title 50″ authorities is unclear. More

 

Pakistan's struggle for LNG

The marginal increase in the GDP between 2009-2010 was not due to any real increase in economic activity rather it reflected the impact of substantial increases in the international price of Pakistan’s largest export item, textiles. Otherwise the impact of the economic crisis is clear and economic growth may continue to nose dive and may not stabilize unless a lasting solution to the energy crisis is found for the country’s 180 million residents.

Apart from its impact upon Pakistan’s economy, the energy crisis has destabilized the routine of every day life for the vast majority of Pakistanis. It affects their behavior and psychology due to their inability to carry out essential daily activities ranging from cooking to commuting to work.

This situation cannot be left unattended. Fuel availability must be expedited, particularly natural gas, in order to arrest the free fall of Pakistan’s economy and to bring solace to its people. The indigenous production of natural gas cannot be increased overnight and the teetering economy coupled with an unstable regional geopolitical situation does not bode well for the success of cross border gas pipelines. Therefore, Pakistan must go for imports of LNG and on a fast track. If Pakistan is unable to bring LNG into the country over the next 3 to 4 years, the whole economic structure built around the natural gas industry will fall into ruins.

Today’s unenviable situation was not created overnight rather it is the cumulative effect of inconsistent and inept energy policies pursued for decades. Successive governments kept on discarding the policies of their predecessors on the basis of political expediency. On this account numerous promising projects have been shelved without looking into their merits. Two examples may suffice to help understand the impact that political rivalries have had on the economic development of the country. The government of the Pakistan (GoP) Muslim League led by Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif initiated the privatization of public sector companies including gas and electricity utilities in the early 1990s which was halted by the succeeding government of Benazir Bhutto’s led Pakistan People Party.

One of the surprising initiatives taken by the Bhutto government was the introduction of Independent Power Producers (IPPs) in 1993 to overcome electricity shortages. This was surprising because the Buhtto government was largely skeptical of the role of the private sector yet she recognized the need for IPPs to fill Pakistan's electricity gap. Though the projects could not be thrown out unilaterally by the succeeding government of Nawaz Sharif due to internationally binding contracts he left no stone untouched to scare off future investors by making life difficult for the IPPs. They were dragged in the courts on the allegation that these power generation projects were unduly favorable to IPPs due to the corruption and favoritism of the outgoing government. (Of note is the fact that the GoP did not have sufficient evidence to prove corruption in the project agreements.)

One of the main reasons behind today’s electricity crisis in Pakistan is the then hounding of the IPPs. Every martial law regime has brought its own economic vision of the country totally discarding the policies of the toppled civilian regimes. Throughout the 65 year history of Pakistan there have been military takeovers of the government four times in total. One of the common allegations against the toppled civilian government in each of the military takeovers has been the pursuit of failed and rather dangerous economic policies. Thus the first step of every martial law regime has been to discard all of the economic policies of the previous government and to introduce its own economic cycle afresh.

There has been no clear direction for increasing resource availability, and the efficient utilization of available resources. Myopic vision has kept policy makers blind of the creeping gap between the country’s energy supply and demand profile. Pakistan’s energy supply mix remains dominated by oil and gas with little contributions from hydroelectricity, coal, and nuclear energy while alternate fuel sources like wind, bio-gas and solar energy are glaringly absent. The composition of Pakistan’s primary energy supply for 2010-11 is given in Table 2 below. More

 

Salafist Movements Threaten World Cultural Heritage By: Hedieh Mirahmadi

The face of radical Islamism has rocked headlines in recent months, demonstrating to the world the threat it poses to Islam’s own cultural heritage.

Many were shocked when spiritual leader Said Efandi al-Chirkawi was killed in a suicide bombing in the tiny Russian Republic of Dagestan by a woman pretending to be one of his students. Nearly 100,000 mourners attended the funeral of the revered cleric, who had been working to bring peace between warring Islamic factions. This was the second such spiritual leader in this remote region to have been killed by radical Islamists in the past year alone.

Elsewhere, in Libya, Mali, Pakistan and Egypt, attacks are also on the rise. Militants around the world are leading a two-pronged assault by targeting outspoken Muslim leaders who denounce violence and by destroying ancient shrines and cultural sites that are respected by Muslims and non-Muslims alike. In recent years, the Taliban’s systematic assassination of moderate Afghan clerics, and their destruction of the sixth-century Buddha statues in 2001, are classic examples of how radical Islamists use terror tactics to solidify their power. This blatant disregard for diverse faith and cultural traditions has grave implications for global security.

When pluralistic social norms are eliminated, it paves the way for hardline forces to rise. Nowhere is this trend more apparent than across Africa, where militants are fueling sectarian and community conflict. Earlier this year in Mali, Islamists of the Ansar Dine organization initiated a campaign to systematically obliterate cultural sites in Timbuktu, including 16 mausoleums of ancient Muslim saints. Many of those cultural sites had recently been put on a list of endangered World Heritage Sites by UNESCO. In late August 2012, armed Salafis in Libya attacked the tomb of Abdel Salam al-Asmar, a 15th-century Muslim scholar who was highly regarded by locals. Nearby in the city, militants also set fire to a historic library, burning centuries of rare academic and religious resources to the ground.

These crimes of intolerance extend to non-Muslim monuments, traditions and places of burial. In March 2012, the Somali terrorist organization al Shabaab desecrated a Christian cross and grave in a cemetery. That same month, former Libyan rebels in Benghazi smashed the headstones and crucifixes of more than 150 British servicemen killed in North Africa. As these broad campaigns continue, local villagers, community activists and everyday citizens watch in horror, thinking of what this destruction means for the future of their respective nations. Most tragically, they feel powerless to stop it.

Unfortunately, the preservation of history and culture is of little value to Salafis, who use violence to implement their own power structures based on extreme interpretations of Islamic law. In an ongoing effort to Islamicize their countries, they cause severe fissures in the countries' social fabric. The most striking example of this is the rise of the Taliban in Pakistan’s northwest frontier area.

When the Taliban swept into the area, traditional Muslim communities faced unprecedented persecution. During their reign of terror, the Taliban razed hundreds of schools in an effort to curb “westernization” and launched attacks on dozens of mosques and mausoleums. In numerous cases the bodies of revered saints and religious figures were disinterred and publically desecrated. While some communities banded together to form peace committees, others joined local militias in an effort to protect their communities from the extremist onslaught. To date, the conflict has killed hundreds of Pakistanis and displaced millions of people, and the Pakistani military has spent billions of US tax dollars to contain the Taliban threat. Still, the region is considered a stronghold of terrorist groups.

Civil-society activists lament that they suffer from a severe lack of funding and resources to organize a nonviolent counter movement. The US government and the international community have a vested interest in protecting and supporting moderate voices as well as the world’s cultural and historical legacies. Whether helping communities develop a neighborhood watch, teaching them how to respond to threats with nonviolent social-mobilization techniques or engaging communities in media and other social campaigns to raise awareness, the strategy of bolstering these groups should be a vital part of a robust program to counter violent extremism. At the same time, it is essential to apply diplomatic pressure on local government and law-enforcement officials who are often accused by their citizens of a lackluster response to the destruction. More

 

Millennials on the next nuclear generation

In the 42 years since the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came into force, much has changed in the world -- the Cold War has ended, the global number of nuclear weapons has decreased, yet the number of nuclear-armed states has increased. What do the next four decades hold in store for nonproliferation and disarmament? For the Millennial Generation, this is no theoretical question -- in about 2054 they will be completing their careers and settling into retirement. Below, Maryam Javan Shahraki of Iran, Selim Can Sazak of Turkey, and Beenish Pervaiz of Pakistan respond to this topic: Forty-two years after the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty went into force, where will the world be in another 42 years? How many states will be nuclear-armed? How many nuclear weapons will exist? And will the NPT survive?

Blueprint for avoiding the crisis by Maryam Javan Shahraki

Forty-two years ago, amid the Cold War, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came into force. The treaty's original purpose was, among other things, to prevent countries like Italy, West Germany, and Japan from building nuclear weapons. But since the end of the Cold War, the goal has evolved into maintaining the global nuclear order. Today, the NPT has 189 signatories and is the arms control treaty with the greatest international acceptance. But the treaty's success in stopping the spread of nuclear weapons is debatable, and serious questions surround the NPT's credibility and effectiveness as the world's central mechanism against further proliferation.

When considering these issues, it is useful to keep in mind just how dangerous a nuclear crisis can be. This year marks the 50th anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis, which brought the world to the brink of nuclear catastrophe. The world survived -- but there is no guarantee it would survive a similar crisis in the future. Indeed, the key lesson of the Cuban Missile Crisis is the importance of preventing a crisis through diplomatic and political efforts before the brink of nuclear war is reached. No matter how imperfect the NPT might be, the treaty still represents a crucial diplomatic tool for anticipating and preventing nuclear crises.

Credibility challenge. Few people dispute that the treaty is necessary; instead, the crucial challenges that it faces involve its effectiveness and credibility. The treaty need not be changed or replaced but, if it is to meet its global objectives, it must be implemented fairly.

One crucial issue related to fairness involves the nuclear weapon states' responsibility to pursue disarmament as defined in the NPT: Each nuclear weapon state commits to taking good-faith steps toward disarmament, a key element of the treaty's central bargain. But this is far from being fully implemented. The United States and Russia control a vast majority of the planet's nuclear weapons and are capable of destroying the world several times over. Since the end of the Cold War, nuclear strategies have changed in many countries, including in the five nuclear weapon states recognized under the treaty. But the central security attitude of the Cold War -- that the more nuclear weapons you have, the more powerful you are -- remains strong.

A similar problem is that the treaty's principles are applied differently to different non-nuclear weapon states. In a glaring example, India in 2008 concluded a nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States, and also received a waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group allowing it to engage in nuclear trade with few restrictions. But India is one of only three states, along with Pakistan and Israel, never to have acceded to the NPT (as for the other two nuclear-armed states, North Korea ratified the treaty, but later withdrew, and South Africa joined the treaty after surrendering its nuclear arsenal); nor have these countries, with the exception of South Africa, ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (though Israel has signed it). It is a mistake to ignore these countries' nonproliferation responsibilities just because they might enjoy good relations with the United States, especially when a treaty signatory like Iran faces international pressure while pursuing its inalienable right to a peaceful nuclear energy program. (Meanwhile, every nuclear-armed state is a potential proliferator, but this fact receives little attention.)

Uneven application of standards could force some countries' nuclear programs underground. But even more important, the treaty's credibility and effectiveness are weakened when different states' obligations and rights are treated unevenly.

Problems and solutions. For the treaty to have survived for 42 years is a great success. But the NPT suffers from serious shortcomings -- both inside and outside the regime. Several steps could be taken to address these shortcomings. First, the world should recommit itself to eliminating nuclear weapons, instead of focusing on nonproliferation to the exclusion of disarmament. Nuclear weapons are exceedingly dangerous no matter who possesses them, and all states -- large or small, treaty signatories or not -- should accept shared responsibility for eliminating them.

Second, variable standards and unjust rules must be avoided. Prioritizing one nation's political interests over global security could bring about the treaty's ultimate failure. The point of the NPT regime is to make the world a safer place, with fewer nuclear bombs. Therefore, the very idea of the treaty is undermined by using the NPT to prevent State X from exercising its legitimate rights while supporting State Y as it exercises the very same rights.

Third, the tendency to turn nuclear issues into security issues -- to remove them from the diplomatic realm and from the context of the treaty -- should be resisted. Indeed, to declare a nuclear dispute an existential threat to the global community, instead of seeking political and diplomatic solutions discredits the treaty itself and also risks turning disputes into crises. As the world should have learned from the Cuban Missile Crisis, last-minute crisis management must not be depended upon. More

 

The four guilty parties behind Israel’s attack

The inciting cause of the latest confrontation between Israel and Hamas has little to do with the firing of rockets, whether by Hamas or the other Palestinian factions. The conflict predates the rockets – and even the creation of Hamas – by decades. It is the legacy of Israel’s dispossession of Palestinians in 1948, forcing many of them from their homes in what is now Israel into the tiny Gaza Strip. That original injustice has been compounded by the occupation Israel has not only failed to end but has actually intensified in recent years with its relentless siege of the small strip of territory.

Why Gaza must suffer again 18 November 2012

The four guilty parties behind Israel’s attack

Israeli Occupation Archive – 18 November 2012

A short interview broadcast by CNN late last week featuring two participants – a Palestinian in Gaza and an Israeli within range of the rocket attacks – did not follow the usual script.

For once, a media outlet dropped its role as gatekeeper, there to mediate and therefore impair our understanding of what is taking place between Israel and the Palestinians, and inadvertently became a simple window on real events.

The usual aim of such “balance” interviews relating to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is twofold: to reassure the audience that both sides of the story are being presented fairly; and to dissipate potential outrage at the deaths of Palestinian civilians by giving equal time to the suffering of Israelis.

But the deeper function of such coverage in relation to Gaza, given the media’s assumption that Israeli bombs are simply a reaction to Hamas terror, is to redirect the audience’s anger exclusively towards Hamas. In this way, Hamas is made implicitly responsible for the suffering of both Israelis and Palestinians.

The dramatic conclusion to CNN’s interview appears, however, to have otherwise trumped normal journalistic considerations.

The pre-recorded interview via Skype opened with Mohammed Sulaiman in Gaza. From what looked like a cramped room, presumably serving as a bomb shelter, he spoke of how he was too afraid to step outside his home. Throughout the interview, we could hear the muffled sound of bombs exploding in the near-distance. Mohammed occasionally glanced nervously to his side.

The other interviewee, Nissim Nahoom, an Israeli official in Ashkelon, also spoke of his family’s terror, arguing that it was no different from that of Gazans. Except in one respect, he hastened to add: things were worse for Israelis because they had to live with the knowledge that Hamas rockets were intended to harm civilians, unlike the precision missiles and bombs Israel dropped on Gaza.

The interview returned to Mohammed. As he started to speak, the bombing grew much louder. He pressed on, saying he would not be silenced by what was taking place outside. The interviewer, Isha Sesay, interrupted – seemingly unsure of what she was hearing – to inquire about the noise.

Then, with an irony that Mohammed could not have appreciated as he spoke, he began to say he refused to be drawn into a comparison about whose suffering was worse when an enormous explosion threw him from his chair and severed the internet connection. Switching back to the studio, Sesay reassured viewers that Mohammed had not been hurt.

The bombs, however, spoke more eloquently than either Mohammed or Nissim. More