Pakistan's growing need for Energy: options of coal, gas & nuclear energy

Pakistan's growing need for Energy: options of coal, gas & nuclear energy and renewables by Dr Maria Sultan, Director General, South Asian Strategic Stability Institute, Pakistan. Published on Dec 19, 2014

www.sassi.org

 

© 2014

No nuclear waste: Fuel of future produced at Russia's high-tech underground plant

Russia’s ‘Breakthrough’ energy project enables closed a nuclear fuel cycle and a future without radioactive waste. The first batch of MOX nuclear fuel has been manufactured for the world’s only NPP industrially power generating breeder reactors.

The first ten kilograms of the mixed-oxide fuel (MOX) - a mixture of plutonium and uranium dioxides (UO2 and PuO2), have been industrially produced by Russia’s nuclear monopoly, Rosatom, at the Mining & Chemical Combine (GKhK) in the Krasnoyarsk region.

Mixed-oxide fuel (MOX

A world first, tablets of the fuel of the future have been put on serial production and are destined for Russia’s next generation BN-800 breeder reactor (880 megawatts), currently undergoing tests at the Beloyarskaya nuclear power plant.

The production line, now undergoing start-up and adjustment, was assembled in a mine 200 meters underground and will become fully operational by the end of 2014.

Fast fission reactors solve the problem of depleted uranium nuclear fuel on the planet. They can ‘burn’ not only ‘classic’ uranium-235, (scarce and already coming to an end), but also uranium-238, which is abundant, and expands the world’s nuclear fuel capacity by an estimated 50 times.

Fuel for breeder reactors could even be made from nuclear waste, which from an ecological point of view is a priceless advantage.

The GKhK facility will be equipped with a unique dissolvent reactor that will break down nuclear waste containing plutonium and extract plutonium dioxide to be used in MOX-fuel production.

Also, while producing electric energy, breeder reactors actually generate more fissile material, and that one also can be used as nuclear fuel.

The GKhK plant is Russia’s leading full nuclear fuel cycle complex, processing nuclear waste from power generating nuclear reactors to establish future nuclear fuel ring closure.

MOX-fuel for previous versions of fast breeder reactors in the USSR and Russia had limited production at Russia’s oldest Mayak nuclear processing facility.

Starting from 2016, industrial-level MOX-fuel production in Russia will run at full capacity.

"Produced MOX-fuel tablets fully conform to the technical specifications," Rosatom’s statement said, adding that the fuel will now be thoroughly tested.

Energy from here to eternity

Humankind has already produced so much nuclear waste that it would take decades, if not hundreds of years to process and recycle it. As of now, the only light at the end of the tunnel is fast-neutron reactor technology.

The fast-neutron nuclear – or breeder - reactors use technology that enables the use of a wider range of radioactive elements as fuel, thus considerably enlarging the potential stock of nuclear fuel for electric power generation.
Russia is the only country that operates fast neutron reactors industrially.

After decades of research, practically all breeder reactor projects around the world, including in the US, France, Japan and several other countries possessing nuclear energy technologies, were closed down. The only country that currently has operating breeder reactor power generation is Russia.

Over the last 50 years the USSR, then Russia, introduced a number of industrial and research fast neutron reactors. One of them, the BN-600 (600 megawatt), running at the Beloyarskaya nuclear power plant since 1980, is the only fast neutron reactor in the world that generates electricity on an industrial scale. The BN-600 is also the most powerful operable fast neutron reactor in the world.

The Beloyarskaya nuclear power plant is in Zarechny, some 45 kilometers from the regional center of Yekaterinburg, in the Urals region.

This year a new BN-800 breeder reactor will become operable at the Beloyarskaya plant.

The service life of the BN-800 breeder reactor is expected to be 45 years. Every month it will produce 475 million kilowatt hours of electricity, enough to ensure constant supply to 3.15 million families (the average monthly consumption of a family of three is 150 kilowatt hours).

The BN-800 uses liquid metal sodium (Na) as a coolant heat transfer agent. Commercial operation of the new reactor is planned to start in early 2015.

Russian physicists have already elaborated the next step for the revolutionary technology: a BN-1200 breeder reactor that is set to be assembled at the same Beloyarskaya nuclear power plant by 2020.

Overall, eight BN-1200 breeder reactors are expected to be constructed by 2030, which means that Russia is the only nation that is entering a new era of nuclear energy power generation – the closed nuclear fuel cycle, in other words truly clean and practically unlimited nuclear power generation. More

 

 

© 2014

India-Japan proliferation: delinquency or a crime? By Mobeen Tariq

The ongoing India-Japan negotiations on a civil nuclear agreement were the hallmark of Indian Premier Modi’s recent visit to Japan.

Modi could not achieve the breakthrough on the much sought after civil nuclear deal. There are issues in the prospective Japan-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement that can have multiple, deplorable implications. India possesses nuclear weapons and has tested these several times. It is not a signatory of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). If nonproliferation norms and Japanese traditional championing of these were to be followed, Tokyo cannot enter into nuclear trade with New Delhi.

Nuclear technology is the key to Japan’s energy sector and affects its industrial output. Overblown safety fears after the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident in 2011 affected the public’s sentiment against nuclear energy but the economic realities have changed the government’s and public’s behaviour. Japan is one of the major traders of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) that was founded in 1975 after India tested a nuclear weapons device using fissile material diverted from fuel provided for nuclear power generation.

India claims to have a huge energy deficit and not having enough uranium to fuel its existing and upcoming nuclear power plants that will add millions of volts to its impoverished energy mix. New Delhi boasts a fat purse and exerts sufficient political influence to woo some nuclear supplier states in foregoing their domestic and international nonproliferation commitments to trade with India. That is why the US arm-twisted the members of the NSG in giving India an exceptional waiver to trade with that country. Japan was also part of that Faustian bargain but Tokyo could not be charmed into becoming the 12th capital with which India could trade in nuclear materials. Giving a NSG waiver was delinquency but nuclear trading or allowing New Delhi to become a member of the group would be a crime. That is perhaps why Japan has demurred from signing a nuclear deal with India.

For its own sake, Japan is gearing up to start a massive nuclear fuel reprocessing plant that can produce nine tonnes of weapons usable plutonium annually, enough for 2,000 atomic bombs!

For its own sake, Japan is gearing up to start a massive nuclear fuel reprocessing plant that can produce nine tonnes of weapons usable plutonium annually, enough for 2,000 atomic bombs! This is in spite of the fact that 150,000 of its people remain homeless and that the nuclear disaster has cost almost $ 100 billion. Japan is a rational state and has reverted to nuclear energy because it is considered a safe and inexhaustible source of energy and a panacea against its dependence on hydrocarbon imports from the Middle East and elsewhere. The South China Sea is gradually becoming a powder keg due to US and Chinese competition, forcing Japan to hedge its bets on safer energy production alternatives to fossil fuels.

Indian negotiations for a civil nuclear deal with Japan started in Tokyo in June 2010. Two consecutive rounds followed in October 2010 and November 2010 in New Delhi and Tokyo. However, India slowed the pace of negotiations in the wake of the Fukushima disaster in March 2011. The last round of talks was held in November 2013. Japanese companies such as specialist reactor vessel manufacturer JSW are keen on signing a nuclear deal but the government has insisted that India agree to more stringent inspections than those required under nuclear cooperation pacts with other countries. In the longer run, Japan will have to make a choice between its trade and geopolitical interests against non-proliferation commitments.

Another hold up in the nuclear deal has been India’s refusal to accept limited liability for commercial operators who supply equipment. The Indian Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act of 2010 is only acceptable to states where their governments provide a financial cushion to the nuclear industry in taking the huge liability enforced by India. The prospective Japan-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement would be a de facto legitimisation of India’s nuclear weapons status. Every gram of nuclear fuel that India would import from Japan would allow its indigenous uranium to be used for nuclear weapons production. If Japan enters a deal with India it joins a dozen others in effectively participating in New Delhi’s burgeoning nuclear weapons production.

India has invested heavily in nuclear technology for prestige and power. In his recent book The Power of Promise: Examining Nuclear Energy in India, Ramana explains how India’s Department of Aatomic Energy first acquired its present political clout, and how the Atomic Energy Commission, which reports directly to the Prime Minister, achieved its immunity to public scrutiny despite repeated failures to meet India’s nuclear energy needs. This domestic dynamic complements Indian global power ambition and some states happily let this happen for their short-term economic and geopolitical interests. It is just a matter of time that Faust will do what he is best at: having bought souls, he will ultimately challenge his hosts.

The writer is a freelance columnist

 

 

© 2014

US may recognize Iran's right to produce fuel for nuclear power plants under certain conditions

However, until the Islamic Republic does not prove that its nuclear program is exclusively peaceful, enriching facilities should be cut, stated Washington, reports Itar-Tass.

Iran and the six world powers resumed talks on Thursday aimed at clinching a long-term deal later this month on the scope of Tehran's contested nuclear program. The cost of failure could be high. If diplomacy falls short, the risk of Israeli air strikes on Iranian nuclear sites could rise, and with it the threat of a wider Middle East conflict, Reuters reports.

After informal contacts on Wednesday, chief negotiators from Iran, the United States, France, Germany, China, Russia and Britain began a full plenary.

There are less than three weeks to try to agree on the future dimensions of Iran's uranium enrichment program and other issues if they are to meet a self-imposed July 20 deadline for a deal. Western officials privately acknowledge that additional talks might be needed.

Washington and some of its allies have imposed sanctions on Iran over suspicions that its nuclear program is designed to produce weapons - a charge denied by Iran, which says it is only interested in producing electricity and other peaceful projects.

US, Iran expected to continue P5+1 nuclear talks in Vienna

US Deputy Secretary of State Bill Burns is expected to attend talks between Iran and the six powers in Vienna this week that aim to strike a nuclear deal by July 20, Reuters reports. The new round of talks starts today and will continue until at least July 15. The presence of the American diplomat who led secret negotiations between Iran and the United States would open up the possibility of bilateral talks between the two diplomatic rivals.

Burns has met the Iranians two times during the last month, first in Geneva for bilateral talks and later in Vienna, where the wider nuclear talks are to be held.

During the latter talks, he broached the possibility of US and Iran's cooperation to stabilize Iraq against an onslaught by Sunni militants.

The primary disagreement between the United States and Iran is over the Iranian nuclear program, which Washington and some of its allies suspect is designed to produce atomic weapons. Iran denies this, saying the program is for peaceful purposes.

The United States along with Britain, China, France, Russia, Germany (the P5+1) and Iran reached an interim pact on Nov. 24 under which Iran won some relief from the economic sanctions in return for reducing some of its nuclear facilities.

Their target is to reach a comprehensive nuclear agreement that would lay to rest Western concerns about the Iranian program and comprehensively ease sanctions on Tehran by July 20, but outside analysts and diplomats are deeply skeptical they can achieve this.

Western officials have said very little progress has been made after five rounds of talks since February toward striking a deal that could end years of hostility and defuse the risk of a new war and a nuclear arms race in the Middle East.

Both sides have said their goal is to have a deal by July 20 and avoid a difficult extension of the interim accord which expires then. Privately, Western diplomats say they would be willing to consider extending the interim deal and continuing talks beyond July 20 only if an agreement was clearly in sight. More

 

© 2014

Thorium: the wonder fuel that wasn't

“Thorium-Fueled Automobile Engine Needs Refueling Once a Century,” reads the headline of an October 2013 story in an online trade publication. This fantastic promise is just one part of a modern boomlet in enthusiasm about the energy potential of thorium, a radioactive element that is far more abundant than uranium.

Thorium promoters consistently extol its supposed advantages over uranium. News outlets periodically foresee the possibility of "a cheaper, more efficient, and safer form of nuclear power that produces less nuclear waste than today's uranium-based technology."

Actually, though, the United States has tried to develop thorium as an energy source for some 50 years and is still struggling to deal with the legacy of those attempts. In addition to the billions of dollars it spent, mostly fruitlessly, to develop thorium fuels, the US government will have to spend billions more, at numerous federal nuclear sites, to deal with the wastes produced by those efforts. And America’s energy-from-thorium quest now faces an ignominious conclusion: The US Energy Department appears to have lost track of 96 kilograms of uranium 233, a fissile material made from thorium that can be fashioned into a bomb, and is battling the state of Nevada over the proposed dumping of nearly a ton of left-over fissile materials in a government landfill, in apparent violation of international standards.

Early thorium optimism. The energy potential of the element thorium was discovered in 1940 at the University of California at Berkeley, during the very early days of the US nuclear weapons program. Although thorium atoms do not split, researchers found that they will absorb neutrons when irradiated. After that a small fraction of the thorium then transmutes into a fissionable material—uranium 233—that does undergo fission and can therefore be used in a reactor or bomb.

By the early 1960’s, the US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) had established a major thorium fuel research and development program, spurring utilities to build thorium-fueled reactors. Back then, the AEC was projecting that some 1,000 nuclear power reactors would dot the American landscape by the end of the 20th century, with a similar nuclear capacity abroad. As a result, the official reasoning held, world uranium supplies would be rapidly exhausted, and reactors that ran on the more-plentiful thorium would be needed.

With the strong endorsement of a congressionally created body, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, the United States began a major effort in the early 1960s to fund a two-track research and development effort for a new generation of reactors that would make any uranium shortage irrelevant by producing more fissile material fuel than they consumed.

The first track was development of plutonium-fueled “breeder” reactors, which held the promise of producing electricity and 30 percent more fuel than they consumed. This effort collapsed in the United States in the early 1980’s because of cost and proliferation concerns and technological problems. (The plutonium “fast” reactor program has been able to stay alive and still receives hefty sums as part of the Energy Department's nuclear research and development portfolio.)

The second track—now largely forgotten—was based on thorium-fueled reactors. This option was attractive because thorium is far more abundant than uranium and holds the potential for producing an even larger amount of uranium 233 in reactors designed specifically for that purpose. In pursuing this track, the government produced a large amount of uranium 233, mainly at weapons production reactors. Approximately two tons of uranium 233 was produced, at an estimated total cost of $5.5 to $11 billion (2012 dollars), including associated cleanup costs.

The federal government established research and development projects to demonstrate the viability of uranium 233 breeder reactors in Minnesota, Tennessee, and Pennsylvania. By 1977, however, the government abandoned pursuit of the thorium fuel cycle in favor of plutonium-fueled breeders, leading to dissent in the ranks of the AEC. Alvin Weinberg, the long-time director of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, was, in large part, fired because of his support of thorium over plutonium fuel.

By the late 1980’s, after several failed attempts to use it commercially, the US nuclear power industry also walked away from thorium. The first commercial nuclear plant to use thorium was Indian Point Unit I, a pressurized water reactor near New York City that began operation in 1962. Attempts to recover uranium 233 from its irradiated thorium fuel were described, however, as a “financial disaster.” The last serious attempt to use thorium in a commercial reactor was at the Fort St. Vrain plant in Colorado, which closed in 1989 after 10 years and hundreds of equipment failures, leaks, and fuel failures. There were four failed commercial thorium ventures; prior agreement makes the US government responsible for their wastes.

Where is the missing uranium 233? As it turned out, of course, the Atomic Energy Commission’s prediction of future nuclear capacity was off by an order of magnitude—the US nuclear fleet topped out at about 100, rather than 1,000 reactors—and the predicted uranium shortage never occurred. America’s experience with thorium fuels faded from public memory until 1996. Then, an Energy Department safety investigation found a national repository for uranium 233 in a building constructed in 1943 at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The repository was in dreadful condition; investigators reported an environmental release from a large fraction of the 1,100 containers “could be expected to occur within the next five years in that some of the packages are approaching 30 years of age and have not been regularly inspected.” The Energy Department later concluded that the building had “deteriorated beyond cost-effective repair. Significant annual costs would be incurred to satisfy current DOE storage standards, and to provide continued protection against potential nuclear criticality accidents or theft of the material.” More

 

© 2014

Onagawa: The Japanese nuclear power plant that didn’t melt down on 3/11

Three years ago, the biggest recorded earthquake in Japanese history hit Tohoku prefecture, leaving more than 20,000 people dead or missing. On the heels of the destructive magnitude 9.0 earthquake came a tsunami that reached a run-up height of 30 meters in some areas, sweeping entire towns away in seconds.

Within the affected area were three nuclear power plants: the Fukushima Daiichi and Daini nuclear power plants operated by the Tokyo Electric Power Company (Tepco), and the Onagawa Nuclear Power Station operated by the Tohoku Electric Power Company. While the three power stations shared similar disaster conditions, nuclear reactor types, dates of operation, and an identical regulatory regime, their fates were very different. The Fukushima Daiichi plant experienced fatal meltdowns and radiation releases. Fukushima Daini was damaged by the earthquake and tsunami, but the heroic efforts and improvisations of its operators resulted in the cold shutdown of all four operating reactors. Onagawa managed to remain generally intact, despite its proximity to the epicenter of the enormous earthquake.

“The earthquake and tsunami of March 11, 2011, were natural disasters of a magnitude that shocked the entire world. Although triggered by these cataclysmic events, the subsequent accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant cannot be regarded as a natural disaster. It was a profoundly manmade disaster—that could and should have been foreseen and prevented.” - Kiyoshi Kurokawa, “Message from the Chairman,” The Official Report of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission

Everyone knows the name Fukushima, but few people, even in Japan, are familiar with the Onagawa power station. Fewer still know how Onagawa managed to avoid disaster. According to a report by the International Atomic Energy Agency mission that visited Onagawa and evaluated its performance, “the plant experienced very high levels of ground motion—the strongest shaking that any nuclear plant has ever experienced from an earthquake,” but it “shut down safely” and was “remarkably undamaged.”

Most people believe that Fukushima Daiichi’s meltdowns were predominantly due to the earthquake and tsunami. The survival of Onagawa, however, suggests otherwise. Onagawa was only 123 kilometers away from the epicenter—60 kilometers closer than Fukushima Daiichi—and the difference in seismic intensity at the two plants was negligible. Furthermore, the tsunami was bigger at Onagawa, reaching a height of 14.3 meters, compared with 13.1 meters at Fukushima Daiichi. The difference in outcomes at the two plants reveals the root cause of Fukushima Daiichi’s failures: the utility’s corporate “safety culture.”

Higher ground. While the Fukushima Daiichi and Onagawa plants are similar in many ways, the most obvious difference is that Tohoku Electric constructed Onagawa’s reactor buildings at a higher elevation than Tepco’s Fukushima reactor buildings. Before beginning construction, Tohoku Electric conducted surveys and simulations aimed at predicting tsunami levels. The initial predictions showed that tsunamis in the region historically had an average height of about 3 meters. Based on that, the company constructed its plant at 14.7 meters above sea level, almost five times that height. As more research was done, the estimated tsunami levels climbed higher, and Tohoku Electric conducted periodic checkups based on the new estimates.

Tepco, on the other hand, to make it easier to transport equipment and to save construction costs, in 1967 removed 25 meters from the 35-meter natural seawall of the Daiichi plant site and built the reactor buildings at a much lower elevation of 10 meters. According to the National Diet of Japan’s Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission (NAIIC), the initial construction was based on existing seismological information, but later research showed that tsunami levels had been underestimated. While Tohoku Electric learned from past earthquakes and tsunamis—including one in Chile on February 28, 2010—and continuously improved its countermeasures, Tepco overlooked these warnings. According to the NAIIC report, Tepco “resorted to delaying tactics, such as presenting alternative scientific studies and lobbying.”

Tepco’s tsunami risk characterization and assessment was, in the judgment of one the world’s renowned tsunami experts, Costas Synolakis, director of the Tsunami Research Center at the University of Southern California, a “cascade of stupid errors that led to the disaster.”

Emergency response. Tohoku Electric also took a different approach to emergency response—one that was more organized, collaborative, and controlled than Tepco’s. Tohoku Electric established an emergency response center at the Onagawa plant, as well as at company headquarters, immediately after the earthquake. Throughout the disaster, headquarters supported the plant operators minute by minute. Supervisors and chief engineers were dispatched to the main control rooms of the damaged reactors to make decisions, and information was sent in a timely manner to all levels of the response team.

Why did the Tohoku Electric team remain more poised and unified than their counterparts at Tepco? According to the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Facilities Research Institute, Yanosuke Hirai, vice president of Tohoku Electric from 1960 to 1975—a time period that preceded the 1980 groundbreaking at Onagawa—was adamant about safety protocols and became a member of the Coastal Institution Research Association in 1963 because of his concern about the importance of protecting against natural disasters. With a senior employee in upper management advocating forcefully for safety, a strong safety culture formed within the company. Representatives of Tohoku Electric participated in seminars and panel discussions about earthquake and tsunami disaster prevention held by the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization. The company implemented strict protocols for disaster response, and all workers were familiar with the steps to be taken when a tsunami was approaching.

These initiatives were not part of Tepco’s culture. The company had a mindset that its domination in the electricity industry was an indication of flawlessness. After the disaster, Hasuike Tooru, the former president of Tepco, described how management decided to lengthen the expected lifetime of power plants, even if there were severe safety consequences.

Safety culture. Government investigations of the Fukushima accident, as well as a statement by US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) chairwoman Allison MacFarlane, have explicitly acknowledged the vital role of safety culture, which the NRC has defined as “the core values and behaviors resulting from a collective commitment by leaders and individuals to emphasize safety over competing goals to ensure protection of people and the environment.”

The NAIIC report described the Fukushima accident as “made in Japan,” because Japan’s nuclear industry failed to absorb the lessons learned from Three Mile Island and Chernobyl. In the words of NAIIC chairman Kiyoshi Kurokawa, “It was this mindset that led to the disaster.” Safety culture has also been implicated as a primary root cause of the Chernobyl accident.

The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station’s meltdowns were not due to the natural disaster, but rather to a series of decisions by Tepco not to be proactive with safety, dating back to when the reactors were being constructed. With most other factors being similar, it was Tokohu Electric’s overall organizational practices and safety culture that saved the day for Onagawa. If safety and disaster response had been properly recognized, addressed, and implemented at Fukushima Daiichi—as they were within Tohoku Electric’s corporate safety culture—perhaps the disastrous meltdowns would have been prevented.

Editor's note: This article is adapted from a research paper based on material available in the public domain in Japan and the United States; the full version of the paper can be found here.

 

© 2014

Agreement Could Catapult New Nuclear Reactor Technology Forward

On Feb. 17, Babcock & Wilcox Co. (B&W) and TerraPower announced the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to support the development of the traveling wave reactor (TWR).

The TWR is a Generation IV commercial reactor design that uses depleted uranium as fuel. The 1,150-MW liquid sodium-cooled fast reactor is different from typical light water reactors because it is able to operate for an extended period using only uranium 238 (U-238) rather than uranium 235 (U-235).

In the past, U-238—a by-product of the enrichment process—had been set aside as waste. The new design could enable a TWR to get up to 50 times more energy out of every pound of mined uranium than could otherwise have been utilized with conventional light water reactor technology.

B&W expects to provide TerraPower with support in many areas, including design and fabrication, fuel services, engineering, operations support, licensing, and testing. It appears that B&W will also continue working on its other nuclear development project, mPower, which is a Generation III++ small, modular reactor (SMR) based on pressurized water reactor technology and standard fuel enriched to 5% U-235.

The TWR and SMR are not the only new nuclear design technologies under development. Prior to the Fukushima disaster, the nuclear industry was flush with new ideas. Now Generation IV designs seem to be picking up steam again.

“We have a long tradition of providing industry leading engineering, manufacturing and services and look forward to supporting TerraPower and to participating in the development of the next generation technology,” said Joe Zwetolitz, president of B&W Nuclear Energy Inc.

“This MOU with B&W makes it possible for us to tap the nuclear industry’s excellence and keep American companies active in the international supply chain for advanced nuclear energy technologies,” Doug Adkisson, senior vice president for TerraPower added.

If all goes as planned, the partners will utilize fast reactor technology, high-performance computing simulations, and real testing in current fast reactor test facilities to make the TWR concept a reality. More

 

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AREVA, EDF sign accords for Saudi nuclear program

RIYADH - EDF and AREVA signed two sets of agreements aimed at supporting the Saudi nuclear energy program on Monday, coinciding with the visit of French President François Hollande's to Riyadh. The two companies have signed Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) with 5 Saudi industrial partners - Zamil Steel, Bahra Cables, Riyadh Cables, Saudi Pumps, Descon Olayan.

The agreements aim to develop the industrial and technical skills of local companies. They reflect AREVA and EDF's desire to build an extended network of Saudi suppliers for future nuclear projects in the country.

A second series of agreements signed with 4 Saudi universities - King Saud University in Riyadh, Dar Al Hekma College and Effat University in Jeddah and finally Prince Mohammed bin Fahd University in Al-Khobar - are intended to contribute to the development of nuclear expertise in the Kingdom.

These agreements follow on from the previous operations organized by EDF and AREVA, through their joint office in Riyadh. These include the "Suppliers' Days" in March and October 2013, the visit to France by Saudi industrial companies in November, the agreement signed with the local professional training institute (NIT) in July 2013, the visits to French nuclear facilities organized for Saudi university faculty members in June 2013 and internship offers made to Saudi students since the summer.

EDF CEO Henri Proglio said: "These new agreements underline EDF and AREVA's commitment alongside the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to enable it to successfully implement its national energy strategy and in particular to develop its future nuclear program by contributing to the development of a local network of manufacturers and by training qualified engineers."

Luc Oursel, President and CEO of AREVA, added: "These agreements demonstrate the common will of EDF and AREVA to establish a true long-term partnership with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. They will enable the country to build a strong industrial base and a robust skills management program."

The EDF group, one of the leaders in the European energy market, is an integrated energy company active in all areas of the business: generation, transmission, distribution, energy supply and trading. The Group is the leading electricity producer in Europe. In France, it has mainly nuclear and hydropower generation facilities where 95.9 percent of the electricity output is CO2-free.

AREVA supplies advanced technology solutions for power generation with less carbon. Its expertise and unwavering insistence on safety, security, transparency and ethics are setting the standard, and its responsible development is anchored in a process of continuous improvement. Ranked first in the global nuclear power industry, AREVA's unique integrated offering to utilities covers every stage of the fuel cycle, nuclear reactor design and construction, and operating services. The group is actively developing its activities in renewable energies - wind, bioenergy, solar and energy storage - to become a European leader in this sector. More

 

 

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Why Saudi Arabia and the U.S. don’t see eye to eye in the Middle East

Give credit to Vladimir Putin and his New York Times op-ed on Syria for sparking a new tactic for foreign leaders hoping to influence American public opinion. In recent weeks, Saudi Arabian political elites have followed Putin’s lead, using American outlets to express their distaste with the West’s foreign policy, particularly with regard to Syria and Iran.

In comments to the Wall Street Journal, prominent Saudi Prince Turki al-Faisal decried the United States for cutting a preliminary deal with Iran on its nuclear program without giving the Saudis a seat at the table, and for Washington’s unwillingness to oppose Assad in the wake of the atrocities he’s committed. Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to Britain followed with an op-ed in the New York Times entitled “Saudi Arabia Will Go It Alone.” The Saudis are clearly upholding the vow made by intelligence chief Bandar bin Sultan back in October to undergo a “major shift” away from the United States.

In light of the recent actions of the Obama administration, many allies are also frustrated and confused, and even hedging their bets in reaction to the United States’ increasingly unpredictable foreign policy. But of all the disappointed countries, none is more so than Saudi Arabia — and with good reason. That’s because the two countries have shared interests historically — but not core values — and those interests have recently diverged.

First, America’s track record in the Middle East in recent years has sowed distrust. The relationship began to deteriorate with the United States’ initial response to the Arab Spring, where its perceived pro-democratic stance stood at odds with the Saudi ruling elite. After Washington stood behind the elections that installed a Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt and then spoke out against the Egyptian army’s attempt to remove President Mohammad Morsi, the Saudi royals were left to wonder where Washington would stand if similar unrest broke out on their soil.

Ian Bremmer

Second, while the oil trade has historically aligned U.S.-Saudi interests, the unconventional energy breakthrough in North America is calling this into question. The United States and Canada are utilizing hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling techniques, leading to a surge in domestic energy production. That development leaves America significantly less dependent on oil from the Middle East, and contributes to the U.S.’ shifting interests and increasing disengagement in the region. Not only does Saudi Arabia lose influence in Washington — many of the top American executives in the oil industry were their best conduits — but it also puts the Saudis on the wrong end of this long-term trend toward increasing global energy supply.

To say that oil is an integral part of Saudi Arabia’s economy is a gross understatement. Oil still accounts for 45 percent of Saudi GDP, 80 percent of budget revenue, and 90 percent of exports. In the months ahead, new oil supply is expected to outstrip new demand, largely on the back of improvements in output in Iraq and Libya. By the end of the first quarter of 2014, Saudi Arabia will likely have to reduce production to keep prices stable. And the trend toward more supply doesn’t take into account the potential for a comprehensive Iranian nuclear deal that would begin to ease sanctions and allow more Iranian crude to reach global markets.

It is this ongoing nuclear negotiation with Iran that poses the principal threat to an aligned United States and Saudi Arabia. An Iranian deal would undercut Saudi Arabia’s leadership over fellow Gulf States, as other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members like Kuwait and the UAE would welcome resurgent trade with Iran. At the same time, Iran would emerge over the longer term as the chief competitor for influence across the broader region, serving as the nexus of Shi’ite power. The Saudis would find themselves most directly threatened by this Shi’ite resurgence within neighboring Bahrain, a majority Shi’ite state ruled by a Sunni regime that is backstopped by the Saudi royals.

The bottom line: the Saudis are actively competing with Iran for influence throughout the Middle East. That’s why the Saudis have the most at stake from any easing of sanctions on Iran, any normalization of relations with the West, or any nuclear breakthrough that gives Iran the ultimate security bargaining chip. The Saudis have reaped the benefits of an economically weak Iran — and they are not prepared to relinquish that advantage. Ultimately, any deal that exchanges Iranian economic security for delays in Iran’s nuclear program is a fundamental problem for Saudi Arabia — as is any failed deal that allows sanctions to unravel.

For all of these reasons, even though the United States will be buying Saudi oil for years to come and will still sell the Saudis weapons, American policy in the Middle East has now made the United States more hostile to Saudi interests than any other major country outside the region. That’s why the Saudis have been so vocal about the United States’ perceived policy failures.

But to say Obama has messed up the Middle East is a serious overstatement. What he has tried to do is avoid getting too involved in a messed up Middle East. Obama ended the war in Iraq. In Libya, he did everything possible to remain on the sidelines, not engaging until the GCC and Arab League beseeched him to — and even then, only in a role of “leading from behind” the French and the British.

Call the Obama policy “engaging to disengage.” In Syria, Obama did everything possible to stay out despite the damage to his international credibility. When the prospect for a chemical weapons agreement arose, he leapt at the chance to point to a tangible achievement that could justify the U.S. remaining a spectator to the broader civil war. In Iran, a key goal of Obama’s diplomatic engagement will be to avoid the use of military force down the road. It hasn’t always been pretty, but Obama has at least been trying to act in the best interests of the United States — interests that are diverging from Saudi Arabia’s. More

 

Ex-Envoy’s Account Clarifies Iran’s 2003 Nuclear Decision

Newly published recollections by the former French ambassador to Iran suggest that Iran was not running a covert nuclear weapons programme that it then decided to halt in late 2003, as concluded by U.S. intelligence in 2007.

Tehran, Iran

Ambassador Francois Nicoullaud recounted conversations with high-ranking Iranian officials indicating that Tehran’s then nuclear policy chief – and now president-elect – Hassan Rouhani did not know what research projects relating to nuclear weapons had been carried out over the years.

The conversations described by Nicoullaud in a Jul. 26 New York Times op-ed also portray Rouhani as having difficulty getting individual researchers to comply with an order to halt all research related to nuclear weapons.

The picture of Iranian nuclear policy in 2003 drawn by Nicoullaud is different from the one in the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate, which concluded that Iran had halted “its nuclear weapons program”. That conclusion implied that Iranian government leadership had organised a programme of research and development aimed at producing a nuclear weapon.

Nicoullaud recalled that a high-ranking Iranian official confided to him in late October 2003 that Rouhani had just “issued a general circular asking all Iranian departments and agencies, civilian and military, to report in detail about their past and ongoing nuclear activities.”

The conversation came immediately after Rouhani had concluded an agreement with the foreign ministers of the UK, France and Germany on Oct. 21, 2003, Nicoullaud recalled.

The same official explained that “the main difficulty Rouhani and his team were encountering was learning exactly what was happening in a system as secretive as Iran’s,” wrote Nicoullaud.

A few weeks after, the French ambassador learned from a second official, whom he described as “a close friend of Rouhani”, that Rouhani’s nuclear policy team had issued instructions to halt projects relating to nuclear weapons.

The Iranian official said the team was “having a hard time”, because, “[p]eople resist their instructions,” according to Nicoullaud. The official remarked that it was difficult to “convince researchers to abruptly terminate projects they had been conducting for years”.

In an e-mail to IPS, Nicoullaud said he did not believe the Iranian government had ever approved a nuclear weapons programme. “The first challenge for Rouhani when he took hold of the nuclear,” said Nicoullaud, “must have been to get a clear picture of what was going on in Iran in the nuclear field.”

Rouhani had been the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) since 1989 and would not only have known about but would have been involved in any government decision to establish a nuclear weapons programme.

“I guess that most people, [Supreme Leader Ali] Khamenei included, were surprised by the extent of the activities,” Nicoullaud told IPS.

Nicoullaud’s recollections are consistent with published evidence that nuclear weapons-related research projects had begun without any government authorisation.

Despite an Iranian policy that ruled out nuclear weapons, many Iranian officials believed that a nuclear weapons “capability” would confer benefits on Iran without actually having nuclear weapons.

But the meaning of such a capability was the subject of ongoing debate. Nasser Hadian, a well-connected Tehran University political scientist, wrote in late 2003 about two schools of thought on the option of having a “nuclear weapons capability” but not the weapons themselves. One definition of that option was that Iran should have only the capability to produce fuel for nuclear reactors, Hadian explained, while the other called for Iran to have “all the necessary elements and capabilities for producing weapons”.

That debate had evidently not been officially resolved by a government decision before Rouhani’s appointment. And in the absence of a clear statement of policy, figures associated with research centres with military and defence ministry ties began in the latter of the 1990s to create their own nuclear weapons-related research projects without the knowledge of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC).

Such projects were apparently begun during a period when the Supreme National Security Council was not exercising tight control over the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran (AEOI), the Ministry of Defence or the military industrial complex controlled by Defence Industries Organisation related to nuclear weapons.

By the mid-1990s, AEOI was already taking advantage of the lax supervision of its operations to take actions that had significant policy implications without authorisation from the SNSC.

Seyed Hossein Mousavian, then the spokesman for Iran’s nuclear negotiating team, recalls in his memoirs that in January 2004, Rouhani revealed to him that AEOI had not informed the SNSC about a policy-relevant matter as important as the purchase of the P2 centrifuge designs from the A. Q. Khan network in 1995. AEOI officials had misled him, Rohani said, by claiming that “they had found some information about P2 centrifuges on the Internet and are studying it!”

When Rouhani was named to take over as nuclear policy coordinator in early October 2003, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was demanding a full accounting by Iran of all of its nuclear activities. Rouhani’s circular to all civilian and military offices about nuclear work came soon after he had promised the IAEA that Iran would change its policy to one of full cooperation with the IAEA.

At the same time, Rouhani moved to tighten up the policy loophole that had allowed various entities to start weapons-related nuclear research.

Rouhani anticipated resistance from the bureaucratic entities that had nuclear weapons-related research projects from the beginning. He recalled in a later interview that he had told President Mohammad Khatami that he expected that there would be problems in carrying out the new nuclear policy, including “sabotage”.

The sequence of events surrounding Rouhani’s new nuclear policy indicates that he used Khamenei’s public posture that nuclear weapons were forbidden according to Islamic law to ensure compliance with the ban on such research projects.

Around the same time that Rouhani ordered the bureaucracy to report on its nuclear-related activities and to stop any research on military applications of nuclear power in late October, Khamenei gave a speech in which he said, “In contrast to the propaganda of our enemies, fundamentally we are against any production of weapons of mass destruction in any form.”

Three days later, Rouhani told students at Shahrud Industrial University that Khamenei considered nuclear weapons as religiously illegal.

That same week, in an interview with San Francisco Chronicle correspondent Robert Collier, Hossein Shariatmadari, the editor of the conservative newspaper Kayhan and an adviser to Khamenei, alluded to tensions between the Rouhani team and those researchers who were not responding to or resisting the Rouhani circular.

Khamenei was forcing those working on such projects to “admit that it is forbidden under Islam”, Shariatmadari said. He also suggested that the researchers resisting the ban had been working “clandestinely”.

After the U.S. intelligence community concluded in November 2007 estimate that Iran had halted a “nuclear weapons program”, a U.S. intelligence official said key pieces of evidence were intercepted communications from at least one senior military officer and others expressing dismay in 2007 that nuclear weapons-related work had been shut down in 2003. More

 

Iran vote: Rouhani vows transparency on nuclear issue

Iran's president-elect, Hassan Rouhani, has thanked Iranians for "choosing moderation".

Hassan Rouhani

In his first press conference since the vote, Mr Rouhani said his government would work towards "constructive interaction with the world".

He saluted what he called "passionate young Iranians" and said he would not forget his election promises.

Mr Rouhani, a long-standing political figure in Iran, won just more than 50% of the vote in Friday's election.

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Of course, the real question is; does the world [read the US and Israel] want constructive interaction with Iran? Editor

 

San Onofre California nuclear plant to shut

A California nuclear power plant will close permanently amid doubts it could operate safely, 18 months after a small radiation leak was discovered.

The San Onofre plant near Los Angeles halted operations in January 2012 after radioactive water tubes were damaged.

Operator Southern California Edison has faced a series of regulatory inquiries.

San Onofre powered 1.4 million homes but regulators say they can supply sufficient electricity through the summer barring threats to other plants.

"[The plant] has served this region for over 40 years," Chief Executive Ted Craver of parent company Edison International said in a statement.

"But we have concluded that the continuing uncertainty about when or if [the plant] might return to service was not good for our customers, our investors, or the need to plan for our region's long-term electricity needs."

With the plant off-line, officials have warned the wildfires that regularly scorch Southern California during the dry summer months could cause power shortages.

Over the last eight months Southern California Edison had sought permission from the federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to restart one reactor and run it at reduced power for five months, in hopes of stopping the vibrations that had damaged the tubing. More

 

South Korea Shuts 2 Reactors Over Faked Certificates

SEOUL, South Korea — South Korea said on Tuesday that it was turning off two nuclear power reactors and delaying the scheduled start of operations at another two after its inspectors discovered that the reactors used components whose safety certificates had been fabricated.

South Korea’s nuclear power industry has been plagued by a series of forced shutdowns, corruption scandals and mechanical failures in recent years, undermining public confidence in atomic energy even as the country’s dependence on it for electricity is expected to grow.

An anonymous whistle-blower led government investigators to uncover the latest problem, in which control cables that had failed to pass a safety test were given fake certificates and supplied to four reactors, the country’s Nuclear Safety and Security Commission said on Tuesday. The control cable is used to send electronic signals to a reactor’s control system in the event of an accident.

The commission halted operations at two reactors on Tuesday so the problematic cables could be replaced. The planned start-up of two other reactors — one under a routine maintenance shutdown and the other a newly built reactor waiting for operational approval — will be delayed for the same reason.

South Korea has 23 reactors, and Tuesday’s decision means that 10 reactors are temporarily offline for safety concerns, maintenance and other reasons, raising the risk of power shortages in the summer, when electricity consumption peaks.

The two reactors shut down on Tuesday are on the southeastern coast of South Korea, and each has a capacity of 1,000 megawatts. The recurring scandals have damaged the reputation of South Korea’s nuclear power industry, which supplies one-third of the country’s electricity needs and aspires to become a global exporter of reactors.

Despite increasing public concern, however, the government remained determined to push ahead with its aggressive nuclear power program; by 2030, the country plans to add 16 more reactors. More

I predicted this in 2007 when speaking to a highly placed individual working in a states nuclear administration. Unfortunately, it was inevitable, given the greed for ever greater profits, from the corporate world. Editor

 

Ex-Regulator Says Reactors Are Flawed

WASHINGTON — All 104 nuclear power reactors now in operation in the United States have a safety problem that cannot be fixed and they should be replaced with newer technology, the former chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission said on Monday. Shutting them all down at once is not practical, he said, but he supports phasing them out rather than trying to extend their lives.

Nine Mile Point Unit 1, New York, November 1969

The position of the former chairman, Gregory B. Jaczko, is not unusual in that various anti-nuclear groups take the same stance. But it is highly unusual for a former head of the nuclear commission to so bluntly criticize an industry whose safety he was previously in charge of ensuring.

Asked why he did not make these points when he was chairman, Dr. Jaczko said in an interview after his remarks, “I didn’t really come to it until recently.”

“I was just thinking about the issues more, and watching as the industry and the regulators and the whole nuclear safety community continues to try to figure out how to address these very, very difficult problems,” which were made more evident by the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan, he said. “Continuing to put Band-Aid on Band-Aid is not going to fix the problem.”

Dr. Jaczko made his remarks at the Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference in Washington in a session about the Fukushima accident. Dr. Jaczko said that many American reactors that had received permission from the nuclear commission to operate for 20 years beyond their initial 40-year licenses probably would not last that long. He also rejected as unfeasible changes proposed by the commission that would allow reactor owners to apply for a second 20-year extension, meaning that some reactors would run for a total of 80 years.

Dr. Jaczko cited a well-known characteristic of nuclear reactor fuel to continue to generate copious amounts of heat after a chain reaction is shut down. That “decay heat” is what led to the Fukushima meltdowns. The solution, he said, was probably smaller reactors in which the heat could not push the temperature to the fuel’s melting point.

The nuclear industry disagreed with Dr. Jaczko’s assessment. “U.S. nuclear energy facilities are operating safely,” said Marvin S. Fertel, the president and chief executive of the Nuclear Energy Institute, the industry’s trade association. “That was the case prior to Greg Jaczko’s tenure as Nuclear Regulatory Commission chairman. It was the case during his tenure as N.R.C. chairman, as acknowledged by the N.R.C.’s special Fukushima response task force and evidenced by a multitude of safety and performance indicators. It is still the case today.”

 

Chinese Chashma Poker Chip? by Mark Hibbs

It’s late Saturday afternoon here in Ipanema, 28 degrees C and fair, and my options are to go back to the beach or blog this. So if I get a little speculative as the paragraphs wear on, just chalk it up to compensating for the opportunity cost of being in Rio de Janeiro in late summer, and having to forego the pleasure of far niente for the task of blogging on the subject of powerful P-5 countries finessing their compliance with multilateral nuclear trade here in Ipanema, 28 degrees C and fair, and my options are to go back to the beach or blog this.

Chashma 3

So if I get a little speculative as the paragraphs wear on, just chalk it up to compensating for the opportunity cost of being in Rio de Janeiro in late summer, and having to forego the pleasure of far niente for the task of blogging on the subject of powerful P-5 countries finessing their compliance with multilateral nuclear trade controls.

The point of departure is this item by Bill Gertz which appeared on Friday.

My initial reaction to it in print was exactly the same as my reaction to it on the phone a week ago when I heard about it in the same breath as developments at this month’s meeting of the NSG’s Consultative Group in Vienna–I wasn’t certain that there was anything new here.

After all, back in early 2010 CNNC’s most important engineering subsidiary had announced here in fine print that it was going ahead with more power reactor sales to Pakistan and, specifically, for its Chashma site. These would become Chashma-3 and -4 projects a year later. A few countries, including the U.S., during NSG discussions in both 2010 and 2011 queried China about these exports. During the 2010 meetings China had little to say except to urge NSG PGs not to worry because all its trade conformed to NSG guidelines. Into 2011 China let on that it would, as many suspected, argue that these projects were grandfathered by a previous agreement with Pakistan.

While in Pakistan in 2011, I learned that construction work on C-3 and C-4 had in fact started, with the preparation of the foundations underway. No one in Pakistan said anything to me about planned construction of a fifth reactor at Chashma however they did report that Pakistan dearly wanted China to keep building still more reactors in Pakistan.

Beginning 18 months before Gertz wrote last week that he obtained from the State Department news that China and Pakistan had made a new reactor deal, Pakistan media were already engaged in wishful thinking about Pakistan importing what China hadunwrapped in 2011 as a new 1,000 PWR design based on exclusively Chinese IPR. The IPR issue provoked me to do some thinking the last couple of days about what might be behind this apparently new transaction, assuming that Gertz’ information is correct.

Has China made a contractual commitment to build Chashma-5? If China were to go through with this transaction, the plant would be the fifth unit China builds at Chashma, and the third after China joined the NSG in 2004 on the basis of information China provided NSG PGs that the existing coopertion agreement between China and Pakistan did not expressly commit China to supply more reactors to Pakistan after C-1/2.

Note that this 1000-MW reactor would be built at a site that has two reactors already set up, as well as C-3/4 under construction, plus lot of other nuclear infrastructure. Imagespublished in 2010 led to speculation that new construction activity at Chashma pointed to erection of new administrative buildings as well as a possible plutonium separation plant.

The point is that this site is hardly a pre-2007 Al-Kibar–there’s lots of new aerial images turning up all the time. So, why, pray tell, would China go to the bother of trying to keep an agreement top secret, as Gertz says, to dig more gaping holes in the ground for a 1,000-MW nuclear power plant?

Maybe the deal with Pakistan isn’t final, in which case discretion merely implies that there is more for the two sides to negotiate (and so there really isn’t anything new here). If there is an MOU or something more, China might want it kept secret for a limited period of time if it considered Chashma-5 as a bargaining chip it could use to obtain certain important benefits.

Since the NSG back in 2010 was confronted by the uncomfortable possibility that China would dish the group about further exports to Pakistan–just two years after Beijing relented to the exception to NSG guidelines proposed by the U.S. for India –some people have considered that a possible way out for the NSG and China would be for both to come to an understanding that China would terminate its nuclear power plant commerce in Pakistan with the completion of C-3/4.

That would permit the NSG to bless the exports of C-3/4 and then in effect close the book and prevent what, if left unresolved, would be seen (especially by NPT parties during the 2015 Revcon) as a challenge to the NSG’s credibility.

Now, China might put Chashma-5 on the table, in effect telling the NSG, “Okay, if the PGs want to get Pakistan and China to fix this nuclear trade regime thing, we could constructively participate in that effort on the basis that we build the 1,000-MW reactor in Pakistan.”

What would China get in return for a deal? Maybe two things:

• a wink and a nod from the U.S. concerning the issue of China’s nuclear trade regime compliance, at a time when the U.S. and China are about to renegotiate a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement to replace a pact which expires in 2015–and which will be reviewed by the U.S. Congress before it can enter into force.

The point of departure is this item by Bill Gertz which appeared on Friday.

My initial reaction to it in print was exactly the same as my reaction to it on the phone a week ago when I heard about it in the same breath as developments at this month’s meeting of the NSG’s Consultative Group in Vienna–I wasn’t certain that there was anything new here.

After all, back in early 2010 CNNC’s most important engineering subsidiary had announcedhere in fine print that it was going ahead with more power reactor sales to Pakistan and, specifically, for its Chashma site. These would become Chashma-3 and -4 projects a year later. A few countries, including the U.S., during NSG discussions in both 2010 and 2011 queried China about these exports. During the 2010 meetings China had little to say except to urge NSG PGs not to worry because all its trade conformed to NSG guidelines. Into 2011 China let on that it would, as many suspected, argue that these projects were grandfathered by a previous agreement with Pakistan.

While in Pakistan in 2011, I learned that construction work on C-3 and C-4 had in fact started, with the preparation of the foundations underway. No one in Pakistan said anything to me about planned construction of a fifth reactor at Chashma however they did report that Pakistan dearly wanted China to keep building still more reactors in Pakistan.

Beginning 18 months before Gertz wrote last week that he obtained from the State Department news that China and Pakistan had made a new reactor deal, Pakistan media were already engaged in wishful thinking about Pakistan importing what China hadunwrapped in 2011 as a new 1,000 PWR design based on exclusively Chinese IPR. The IPR issue provoked me to do some thinking the last couple of days about what might be behind this apparently new transaction, assuming that Gertz’ information is correct.

Has China made a contractual commitment to build Chashma-5? If China were to go through with this transaction, the plant would be the fifth unit China builds at Chashma, and the third after China joined the NSG in 2004 on the basis of information China provided NSG PGs that the existing coopertion agreement between China and Pakistan did not expressly commit China to supply more reactors to Pakistan after C-1/2.

Note that this 1000-MW reactor would be built at a site that has two reactors already set up, as well as C-3/4 under construction, plus lot of other nuclear infrastructure. Imagespublished in 2010 led to speculation that new construction activity at Chashma pointed to erection of new administrative buildings as well as a possible plutonium separation plant.

The point is that this site is hardly a pre-2007 Al-Kibar–there’s lots of new aerial images turning up all the time. So, why, pray tell, would China go to the bother of trying to keep an agreement top secret, as Gertz says, to dig more gaping holes in the ground for a 1,000-MW nuclear power plant?

Maybe the deal with Pakistan isn’t final, in which case discretion merely implies that there is more for the two sides to negotiate (and so there really isn’t anything new here). If there is an MOU or something more, China might want it kept secret for a limited period of time if it considered Chashma-5 as a bargaining chip it could use to obtain certain important benefits.

Since the NSG back in 2010 was confronted by the uncomfortable possibility that China would dish the group about further exports to Pakistan–just two years after Beijing relented to the exception to NSG guidelines proposed by the U.S. for India –some people have considered that a possible way out for the NSG and China would be for both to come to an understanding that China would terminate its nuclear power plant commerce in Pakistan with the completion of C-3/4.

That would permit the NSG to bless the exports of C-3/4 and then in effect close the book and prevent what, if left unresolved, would be seen (especially by NPT parties during the 2015 Revcon) as a challenge to the NSG’s credibility.

Now, China might put Chashma-5 on the table, in effect telling the NSG, “Okay, if the PGs want to get Pakistan and China to fix this nuclear trade regime thing, we could constructively participate in that effort on the basis that we build the 1,000-MW reactor in Pakistan.”

What would China get in return for a deal? Maybe two things:

• a wink and a nod from the U.S. concerning the issue of China’s nuclear trade regime compliance, at a time when the U.S. and China are about to renegotiate a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement to replace a pact which expires in 2015–and which will be reviewed by the U.S. Congress before it can enter into force.

More