Tomgram: Patrick Cockburn, How to Ensure a Thriving Caliphate

Think of the new “caliphate” of the Islamic State, formerly the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), as George W. Bush and Dick Cheney's gift to the world (with a helping hand from the Saudis and other financiers of extremism in the Persian Gulf). How strange that they get so little credit for its rise, for the fact that the outlines of the Middle East, as set up by Europe’s colonial powers in the wake of World War I, are being swept aside in a tide of blood.

Had George and Dick not decided on their “cakewalk” in Iraq, had they not raised the specter of nuclear destruction and claimed that Saddam Hussein’s regime was somehow linked to al-Qaeda and so to the 9/11 attacks, had they not sent tens of thousands of American troops into a burning, looted Baghdad (“stuff happens”), disbanded the Iraqi army, built military bases all over that country, and generally indulged their geopolitical fantasies about dominating the oil heartlands of the planet for eternity, ISIS would have been an unlikely possibility, no matter the ethnic and religious tensions in the region. They essentially launched the drive that broke state power there and created the kind of vacuum that a movement like ISIS was so horrifically well suited to fill.

All in all, it’s a remarkable accomplishment to look back on. In September 2001, when George and Dick launched their “Global War on Terror” to wipe out -- so they then claimed -- “terrorist networks” in up to 60 countries, or as they preferred to put it, “drain the swamp,” there were scattered bands of jihadis globally, while al-Qaeda had a couple of camps in Afghanistan and a sprinkling of supporters elsewhere. Today, in the wake of the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq and an air power intervention in Libya, after years of drone (and non-drone) bombing campaigns across the Greater Middle East, jihadist groups are thriving in Yemen and Pakistan, spreading through Africa (along with the U.S. military), and ISIS has taken significant parts of Iraq and Syria right up to the Lebanese border for its own bailiwick and is still expanding murderously, despite a renewed American bombing campaign that may only strengthen that movement in the long run.

Has anyone covered this nightmare better than the world’s least embedded reporter, Patrick Cockburn of the British Independent? Not for my money. He’s had the canniest, clearest-eyed view of developments in the region for years now. As it happens, when he publishes a new book on the Middle East (the last time was 2008), he makes one of his rare appearances at TomDispatch. This month, his latest must-read work, The Jihadis Return: ISIS and the New Sunni Uprising, is out. Today, this website has an excerpt from its first chapter on why the war on terror was such a failure (and why, if Washington was insistent on invading someplace, it probably should have chosen Saudi Arabia). It includes a special introductory section written just for TomDispatch. Thanks go to his publisher, OR Books. Tom

Why Washington’s War on Terror Failed

The Underrated Saudi Connection

By Patrick Cockburn

[This essay is excerpted from the first chapter of Patrick Cockburn’s new book, The Jihadis Return: ISIS and the New Sunni Uprising, with special thanks to his publisher, OR Books. The first section is a new introduction written for TomDispatch.]

There are extraordinary elements in the present U.S. policy in Iraq and Syria that are attracting surprisingly little attention. In Iraq, the U.S. is carrying out air strikes and sending in advisers and trainers to help beat back the advance of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (better known as ISIS) on the Kurdish capital, Erbil. The U.S. would presumably do the same if ISIS surrounds or attacks Baghdad. But in Syria, Washington’s policy is the exact opposite: there the main opponent of ISIS is the Syrian government and the Syrian Kurds in their northern enclaves. Both are under attack from ISIS, which has taken about a third of the country, including most of its oil and gas production facilities.

But U.S., Western European, Saudi, and Arab Gulf policy is to overthrow President Bashar al-Assad, which happens to be the policy of ISIS and other jihadis in Syria. If Assad goes, then ISIS will be the beneficiary, since it is either defeating or absorbing the rest of the Syrian armed opposition. There is a pretense in Washington and elsewhere that there exists a “moderate” Syrian opposition being helped by the U.S., Qatar, Turkey, and the Saudis. It is, however, weak and getting more so by the day. Soon the new caliphate may stretch from the Iranian border to the Mediterranean and the only force that can possibly stop this from happening is the Syrian army.

The reality of U.S. policy is to support the government of Iraq, but not Syria, against ISIS. But one reason that group has been able to grow so strong in Iraq is that it can draw on its resources and fighters in Syria. Not everything that went wrong in Iraq was the fault of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, as has now become the political and media consensus in the West. Iraqi politicians have been telling me for the last two years that foreign backing for the Sunni revolt in Syria would inevitably destabilize their country as well. This has now happened.

By continuing these contradictory policies in two countries, the U.S. has ensured that ISIS can reinforce its fighters in Iraq from Syria and vice versa. So far, Washington has been successful in escaping blame for the rise of ISIS by putting all the blame on the Iraqi government. In fact, it has created a situation in which ISIS can survive and may well flourish.

Using the al-Qa'ida Label

The sharp increase in the strength and reach of jihadist organizations in Syria and Iraq has generally been unacknowledged until recently by politicians and media in the West. A primary reason for this is that Western governments and their security forces narrowly define the jihadist threat as those forces directly controlled by al-Qa‘ida central or “core” al-Qa‘ida. This enables them to present a much more cheerful picture of their successes in the so-called war on terror than the situation on the ground warrants.

In fact, the idea that the only jihadis to be worried about are those with the official blessing of al-Qa‘ida is naïve and self-deceiving. It ignores the fact, for instance, that ISIS has been criticized by the al-Qa‘ida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri for its excessive violence and sectarianism. After talking to a range of Syrian jihadi rebels not directly affiliated with al-Qa‘ida in southeast Turkey earlier this year, a source told me that “without exception they all expressed enthusiasm for the 9/11 attacks and hoped the same thing would happen in Europe as well as the U.S.”

Jihadi groups ideologically close to al-Qa‘ida have been relabeled as moderate if their actions are deemed supportive of U.S. policy aims. In Syria, the Americans backed a plan by Saudi Arabia to build up a “Southern Front” based in Jordan that would be hostile to the Assad government in Damascus, and simultaneously hostile to al-Qa‘ida-type rebels in the north and east. The powerful but supposedly moderate Yarmouk Brigade, reportedly the planned recipient of anti-aircraft missiles from Saudi Arabia, was intended to be the leading element in this new formation. But numerous videos show that the Yarmouk Brigade has frequently fought in collaboration with JAN, the official al-Qa‘ida affiliate. Since it was likely that, in the midst of battle, these two groups would share their munitions, Washington was effectively allowing advanced weaponry to be handed over to its deadliest enemy. Iraqi officials confirm that they have captured sophisticated arms from ISIS fighters in Iraq that were originally supplied by outside powers to forces considered to be anti-al-Qa‘ida in Syria. More

 

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Pakistan tribal areas: what matters

Within Pakistan and internationally, there is a growing recognition that well-off tribesman will not become the tools of terrorist organizations. But will it come soon enough?

Since the most recent phase of US involvement in Afghanistan began, Pakistan has been a witness to

multiple terrorist attacks on its soil in one form or the other. It has been generally recognised that Pakistan has suffered grave consequences from this conflict. Unfortunately, media outlets and commentators consistently refer to terrorist activities taking place in Pakistan as being undertaken by the ‘Taliban’ or ‘Terrorist Organizations’.

It needs to be understood that every tribal man is not a terrorist. On analyzing tribal areas in Pakistan it is clear that there exist some traditional socio-political norms and values there which are understood as acts of terrorists by others. For instance, by the end of President Zia’s administration the majority of the population kept guns for self protection. Nowadays if an individual is armed they are termed as a terrorist by default.

There are a number of groups in tribal regions who are neither Taliban members nor terrorists but instead view them as criminals, to be despised by the majority of the population. The first such group is the country’s elite. These groups may have links with particular tribal regions in that they are involved in policy making or political representation for those regions. Unfortunately however, they are disconnected from the real issues facing the local population.

The second category is the middle class which makes up a substantial portion of society. This is an interesting group in that they want to be a part of progressive social developments and are equipped with some of the means to do so. However at the same time their progress is being hampered by a number of factors. They want to play a role in policy making and escape the influence of terrorism but are failing to do so, primarily due to the economic pressure under which they find themselves.

The third category consists of people living below the poverty line. These are the people who have actually suffered throughout. They essentially have no choice but to act according to the demands of external influences within their region. If they live in an area which is under the influence of the Taliban then they are compelled to adhere to their wishes, but if Taliban influence diminishes then this often precipitates a shift in the mindset of the local population.

The most pertinent example here is the operation that took place in the Swat region close to the Afghan-Pakistan border. Before the initiation of the operation in Swat the local populace was supportive of the Taliban and the majority of the young joined up with the Taliban in order to secure an income. The reason being that the poor run towards bread: that is to say they seek to grasp the maximum economic benefits from their actions.

After the army’s intervention in these areas people have become highly supportive of the state military forces. This is because they understand that state institutions are able to provide them with security. A man in uniform has rules to obey and is required to protect the interests of the state - he is answerable to the system because he is part of the system. The tribesmen feel that they are deprived of the basic necessities of life. They lead an isolated existence as no one is ready to bring them into the mainstream, in part because liberals are not ready to accommodate them within society.

President Musharraf ushered in change post 9/11 when he banned all jihadi organizations in Pakistan. Many jihadists fled to tribal areas and the relics of both Al-Qaeda and Afghani Taliban joined them in the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA). There they had initial success in recruiting members through economic rewards, and later through religious ideology. Al-Qaeda and the Taliban possess substantial strategic experience. They knew exactly how to deal with the tribesmen in order to use them for their own purposes. Initially, the tribesmen were committed to not attacking Pakistani state forces, but the Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda successfully turned the them against the state. They accomplished this by launching terrorist attacks within Pakistan, in turn forcing the army to launch military operations in FATA, previously designated as no-go areas for them.

The United States are currently engaged in peace talks with the Taliban. They have also pushed Pakistan to continue its military operations in these areas, inadvertently providing new opportunities to radicalise elements within FATA. This is a wake up call for Pakistan. They should be making intensive use of non-military strategies and projects. Haqooq-e-Balochistan should be given to the tribal areas of Balochistan, and the needs of the tribes must be treated in the same way as those of other Pakistani citizens. Quality education, implementation of proper security measures and job opportunities can transform this region from an extremist to a moderate hub. The US has to realize that assisting the development of FATA will be a benefit to their own cause. So called ‘Reconstruction Opportunity Zones’ can be very helpful if implemented properly. There is a growing recognition that well-off tribesman will not become the tools of terrorist organizations. This approach will damage those terrorist activities around the globe that take place under the banner of “Global Jihad”. More