Revival of Political Islam in the Aftermath of Arab Uprisings: Implications for the Region and Beyond

Authored by Dr. Mohammed El-Katiri.

Brief Synopsis

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Regime change during the Arab Spring allowed Islamist political forces that had long been marginalized to achieve political influence in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. Morocco’s first government led by an Islamist party has been in power since January 2012. This trend caused widespread concern over the future direction of these states; but despite the tragic example of Egypt, few negative predictions have yet been borne out. The author cautions against an overly simplistic assessment of this rise in the influence and power of political Islam. He shows that the political crises besetting each of these Islamist governments are not necessarily of their own making, but instead are determined by objective circumstances. Dr. El-Katiri describes how, in several key respects, the aims of Islamist parties are in line with U.S. aspirations for the region.

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© 2014

Conflict over water in cross-border river basins – the need for peaceful cooperation by Peter Brabeck-Letmathe

In January 2005, I organised the first discussion on water at the World Economic Forum in Davos. Avishay Braverman, a leading Israeli politician, and then President of Ben Gurion University of the Negev, was one of the invited panelists. He spoke about the battle over water – some were even seeing the risks of war over water – in the Middle East and elsewhere.

But he made it very clear: “Water is not the reason for war; it is only an excuse for war." Another quote from Malidoma Somé, an initiated Elder into the Dagara Tribe of West Central Africa and holder of a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Sorbonne: “The Dagara tribe of West Central Africa successfully categorize their people into five different categories: fire, water, mineral, earth and nature. The "water" people are usually considered the peacemakers. They are the ones with the ability to reconcile differences, both differences within the self and differences with one another.”

Recently the rivalries between Egypt and Ethiopia have drawn worldwide attention. The two nations’ dispute over the construction of the Ethiopian giant dam is escalating.

Ethiopia announced its Ethiopian Grand Renaissance Dam project in 2011. The project is located in the Benishangul-Gumuz Region of Ethiopia, about 40km east of the border with Sudan. When completed, it will be one of the largest dams in Africa, with a capacity of 63 billion cubic meters, and since it was announced the project has caused a battle between Egypt and Ethiopia over water resources.

Ethiopian officials claim that the project is “win-win”, whereas Egyptians disagree, and some Egyptian politicians were even reported as saying that “it might be better to bomb the dam or to arm Ethiopian guerrillas to pressure the government in Addis Ababa” (Financial Times article, ‘Water: Battle of the Nile’).

The Nile, as one of the longest rivers in the world, passes through 11 countries: Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, South Sudan and Egypt. Two main tributaries, the White Nile and the Blue Nile, meet at Khartoum and flow northwards through the Sahara desert. Between 80-90%of the Nile’s flow comes from the Blue Nile and the other rivers (such as Atbara) which originate in the Ethiopian Highlands, while the White Nile contributes 10-20 % of the annual Nile discharge (State of the Nile Basin 2012).

In the northern part of the Nile basin, where Egypt, Sudan and South Sudan lie, there is virtually no rainfall in the summer. In contrast, the southern portion, which encompasses the Ethiopian Highlands, has heavy rains during the summer months. Evaporation is averagely high in the basin, but also varies from country to country. In the desert area, evaporation is low, as there is little available water despite higher temperatures. In contrast, the Ethiopian Highlands experience lower temperatures. Therefore, less rainfall is evaporated and more appears as run off. This link, to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, highlights the natural water balance across each country around the Nile Basin. (See Table 1.)

Up to now, most of the water withdrawal from the Nile River has been used for irrigation in Egypt, Sudan and South Sudan, while upstream countries such as Ethiopia were barely using Nile waters. The latter are increasingly looking into the potential of Nile as a source of water and power supply, in order to develop their domestic economy including agricultural activities.

Fighting for water resources in the shared river basin is not something new. As a typical example, the uneven distribution of water resources in the Nile Basin, due to geological, historical, economic and political reasons, has caused tension between downstream countries (Egypt, Sudan and South Sudan) and those sitting upstream. In recent decades, rivalry between nations and threat for political security in the basin has escalated, with increasing water resource scarcity under the pressure of fast growing populations, economic development, and climate change.

A consensus among all involved stakeholders is key to settling the issue in the long term, and it should be based on a holistic understanding of the challenges and with a focus on sustainable development across the whole basin. This has technical, economic and political aspects. One is the loss of water from the river due to evaporation: for instance, less than half of the water entering the Sudd region, a vast swamp in South Sudan, flows out of it into the White Nile. The rest disappears through evaporation and evapotranspiration. More water is lost between Sudd and Assuan, and then, in particular, in Lake Assuan. Research therefore suggests that from a water economy view it would be better to withdraw water for irrigation upstream than downstream before large parts of it are lost through evaporation (Whittington et al., 2004). Goods with the water embedded in food grown further upstream could then be traded to supply downstream consumers (see my previous post on virtual water trade).

Another aspect to be considered is irrigation efficiencies. Let me illustrate this with FAO data on irrigation water requirement and agricultural water withdrawal between 1993 and 2007 in the countries in the basin. The country with the highest irrigation efficiency among these 11 countries is Egypt, at 76.5%, following by Uganda at 52.2%. The irrigation efficiency in the rest of the countries is only around 20%. Agricultural water withdrawal accounts for 93.6% of total water withdrawal. That makes 3.7 billion cubic meters of water loss from irrigation every year in the nation, accounting for 6% of the capacity of the reservoir under construction. Given the large percentage that agricultural water withdrawal represents of total water withdrawal - 73.4% on average in all of these countries - we know that a total of nearly 42 billion cubic meters of water withdrawn for irrigation every year from the river basin is lost.

Just by looking at this data, it is clear that establishing effective common cross-border water strategies and management schemes, and adopting tools such as the water cost curve strategy proposed by 2030 Water Resource Group to improve the efficiency in local water use (especially irrigation), are essential for relieving water shortage stress in the Basin and ultimately, avoid conflict.

A consensus, involving technical, economic, and political measures, will be the way out of the current situation that threatens peace and development in this region.

No doubt, the issue requires further discussion; I would welcome any thoughts and comments. More

The Nile River and who’s giving a “dam” over its future

Egypt has been in danger of losing a part of its water lifeline the Nile River. Ethiopia is dead set on constructing a giant dam over their part of the mighty river. And both parties still don’t see eye to eye.

Renaissance Dam

This project, which was planned for the Blue Nile by Ethiopia, is just a part the water problems of population dense Egypt; which also loses a significant part of Nile River water from other sources: evaporation, leaky water pipe infrastructure, and from vegetation growing on the banks of the Nile and on river islands.

Talks between water resource ministers of three of the countries that share the Nile’s water resources, Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan, ended inconclusively this week in Khartoum, with the participants agreeing to meet meet again next month.

The ‘successful’ Egypt-Ethiopia talks failed to end differences over Nile water. A number of unresolved issues still remain to be solved. They revolve around Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance Dam project on Ethipia’s upstream portion of the Nile, called the Blue Nile. Many water experts say this project could ”damn Egypt’s development future”. Bur Ethiopia feels that this water is their energy right.

Ethiopia is an energy-poor country that is also plagued by drought and famine. Constructing the massive dam will provide it with both increased water supplies and with hydro-electric power. According to Middle East Online, Ethiopia began diverting the Blue Nile in May to build the 6,000 MW dam, which will be the largest dam built in Africa when completed in 2017.

Although Ethiopian water experts claim that Egypt’s water loss from the project will be “minimal”, Egypt claims that it has ‘historic rights’ to the use of Nile water. These rights stem from two treaties made in 1929 and 1959 that allow it 87 percent of the Nile’s flow and gives it veto power over upstream water projects.

Egypt itself constructed a large dam on the Nile at Aswan (see above photo), which was completed in 1970 during the presidency of Gamal Abdel Nasser.

This ten-year project caused much controversy and resulted in many historic archeological sites having to be relocated due to subsequent flooding by what is now known as Lake Nasser.

A dam on the Blue Nile by Ethiopia would obviously have an affect on both neighboring Sudan and Egypt.

Sudan, which like Egypt has still not signed Nile water use treaties with Ethiopia, has said that it will not be so much affected by the Renaissance Dam project. Sudan, Egypt’s long time ally, has apparently switched sides in favor of Ethiopia in regards to this project.

The unresolved issues dealing with the project will be further discussed when the water ministers meet again on January 4. After being weakened following the political turmoil of the Arab Spring uprisings, Egypt appears to be less able to exert its influence over Ethiopia on this important issue. More

 

All states need to resolve their riverine / water sharing issues in a equitable manner via treaty as soon as possible. This needs to be acomplished in the near term, before climate change progresses any further. Water is, unfortunatly, the new oil and as we all realise oil has caused conflicts, and water, given its necessity to sustaining life has a much higher potential to trigger conflict. Editor

 

Murdering The Wretched Of The Earth - By Chris Hedges

Radical Islam is the last refuge of the Muslim poor. The mandated five prayers a day give the only real structure to the lives of impoverished believers. The careful rituals of washing before prayers in the mosque, the strict moral code, along with the understanding that life has an ultimate purpose and meaning, keep hundreds of millions of destitute Muslims from despair.

The fundamentalist ideology that rises from oppression is rigid and unforgiving. It radically splits the world into black and white, good and evil, apostates and believers. It is bigoted and cruel to women, Jews, Christians and secularists, along with gays and lesbians. But at the same time it offers to those on the very bottom of society a final refuge and hope. The massacres of hundreds of believers in the streets of Cairo signal not only an assault against a religious ideology, not only a return to the brutal police state of Hosni Mubarak, but the start of a holy war that will turn Egypt and other poor regions of the globe into a caldron of blood and suffering.

The only way to break the hold of radical Islam is to give its followers a stake in the wider economy, the possibility of a life where the future is not dominated by grinding poverty, repression and hopelessness. If you live in the sprawling slums of Cairo or the refugee camps in Gaza or the concrete hovels in New Delhi, every avenue of escape is closed. You cannot get an education. You cannot get a job. You do not have the resources to marry. You cannot challenge the domination of the economy by the oligarchs and the generals. The only way left for you to affirm yourself is to become a martyr, or shahid. Then you will get what you cannot get in life—a brief moment of fame and glory. And while what will take place in Egypt will be defined as a religious war, and the acts of violence by the insurgents who will rise from the bloodied squares of Cairo will be defined as terrorism, the engine for this chaos is not religion but the collapsing economy of a world where the wretched of the earth are to be subjugated and starved or shot. The lines of battle are being drawn in Egypt and across the globe. Adli Mansour, the titular president appointed by the military dictator of Egypt, Gen. Abdul-Fattah el-Sisi, has imposed a military-led government, a curfew and a state of emergency. They will not be lifted soon.

The lifeblood of radical movements is martyrdom. The Egyptian military has provided an ample supply. The faces and the names of the sanctified dead will be used by enraged clerics to call for holy vengeance. And as violence grows and the lists of martyrs expand, a war will be ignited that will tear Egypt apart. Police, Coptic Christians, secularists, Westerners, businesses, banks, the tourism industry and the military will become targets. Those radical Islamists who were persuaded by the Muslim Brotherhood that electoral politics could work and brought into the system will go back underground, and many of the rank and file of the Muslim Brotherhood will join them. Crude bombs will be set off. Random attacks and assassinations by gunmen will puncture daily life in Egypt as they did in the 1990s when I was in Cairo for The New York Times, although this time the attacks will be wider and more fierce, far harder to control or ultimately crush.

What is happening in Egypt is a precursor to a wider global war between the world’s elites and the world’s poor, a war caused by diminishing resources, chronic unemployment and underemployment, overpopulation, declining crop yields caused by climate change, and rising food prices. Thirty-three percent of Egypt’s 80 million people are 14 or younger, and millions live under or just above the poverty line, which the World Bank sets at a daily income of $2 in that nation. The poor in Egypt spend more than half their income on food—often food that has little nutritional value. An estimated 13.7 million Egyptians, or 17 percent of the population, suffered from food insecurity in 2011, compared with 14 percent in 2009, according to a report by the U.N. World Food Program and the Egyptian Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS). Malnutrition is endemic among poor children, with 31 percent under 5 years old stunted in growth. Illiteracy runs at more than 70 percent. More

 

Climate change and water mismanagement parch Egypt

Climate change, a fast growing population, ill-designed infrastructure, high levels of pollution and lack of law enforcement have made Egypt a country thirsty for water — both in terms of quantity and quality.

The River Nile, which is considered poor by many experts and hydrologists, lies at lower altitude than the rest of the country. Massive electric pumps extract the water from the river’s bed and canals and direct it to industry, agriculture and for individual water use.

A significant portion of the water contained in Lake Nasser’s 5,000 square kilometer basin is lost to evaporation, while old networks of leaking pipes also deprive the country of satisfactory access to its most important resource: water.

In order to debate water scarcity in Egypt, its causes, and how climate change makes the issue more pressing than ever, as well as looking to solutions, a panel of experts were invited to participate in the 13th Cairo Climate Talk last week entitled “Growing Thirst: Sustainable Water Solutions for Egypt.”

Tarek Kotb, the First Assistant Minister in the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation, and a member of the panel discussion, talked about the dwindling water share per capita with a sense of urgency. “Every year, the Egyptian population grows by 1.8 million, while the annual quota of Nile water allocated to Egypt, 55 billion cubic meters, has remained unchanged since the 1959 Nile Water Agreement,” he says.

While Egyptians in the 1960s could enjoy a water share per capita of 2800 cubic meters for all purposes, the current share has dropped to 660 cubic meters today—below the international standard defining water poverty of 1000 cubic meters.

Kotb estimates that Egypt is gradually going to leave the stage of water scarcity and enter a phase of drastic water stress in the next 40 years, if no sustainable water management is put in place.

“By 2050, there will be about 160 million Egyptians and only 370 cubic meters of water per capita,” he says. While Egypt has other options for its water needs, such as tapping into groundwater basins and desalinating sea-water, the bulk of water is still extracted from the Nile, leading to longstanding tensions with the other Nile basin countries.

The treaty signed under colonial rule in 1959 granted Egypt and Sudan most of the Nile water share, while upstream countries were given access to a very small allocation of water. Lama al-Hatow, a hydrologist and one of the founders of the Water Institute for the Nile (WIN) condemns Egypt’s historical and ongoing hydro hegemony, by which the country claims its entitlement to benefit from most of the Nile water.

“A lot of science has been published on how not to lose water if the Ethiopian Millennium Dam is built, but it is not given much attention by the politicians,” Hatow says. “The upstream countries have the right to develop,” she says, “and there are ways to make it happen without Egypt losing water.”

She adds that preventing water evaporation in Lake Nasser could even increase Egypt’s water share.

Kotb responding to her remarks, saying that Egypt is investing millions of dollars in Sudan, South Sudan and Ethiopia to overcome losses due to evaporation in marshes and basins. “We don’t deny these countries’ right to development; actually, we help them,” he said.

Claudia Bürkin, the Water Sector Coordinator for the German Development Cooperation and Senior Programme Manager at KfW Development Bank, explains that Egypt’s water resources face two main challenges: water loss and bad quality.

“Egypt loses about 50% of its freshwater through poor maintenance of supplies and distribution problems, and the water is polluted,” she says, stressing that a significant number of diseases are water borne. Polluted water also affects the ecosystems’ balance, the soil quality, and seeps into the aquifers. “Egypt needs to set up strong standards for water quality and control the drainage nutrients, pesticides and waste found in the water.”

Kotb admits that while most of the issues and potential solutions have been identified by the government, much needs to be done in terms of implementation of existing laws and stronger cooperation between ministries.

“Water management is not the mandate of the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation exclusively, which makes the implementation process so much harder,” he says.

A National Water Resource Plan was established a few years ago, Kotb says, to curb the amount of pollution in the Nile emanating from cruise boats, factories, industries and villagers deprived of a waste management system. As part of this, he explains, factories located close to the Nile or the canals have been moved further away from the water streams, and new industries will be prevented from setting up a plant within 20km from the water.

“Law 48 on pollution has been reviewed and the penalties will be tougher,” he says. Meanwhile, Hatow argues that enforcing stronger penalties is not the solution to prevent farmers from polluting.

“Instead of punishing them, we should give farmers incentives to make better use of water, and provide them with premium crops,” she says.

The conversation then shifted to the effects of climate change, which can already be felt in the Northern part of the Delta and in the Mediterranean coastal cities of Damietta and Rosetta. The gradual rise in sea levels taking place turns fields into barren land unfit for agriculture, and the sea water that infiltrates the Nile is reaching further and further away from the coast.

“In order to keep a good yield and maintain agricultural production,” says Kotb, “we need to use more fresh water to combat rising temperatures.”

Lama’s take on how to combat climate change is quite different from this. “We need to study community based resilience techniques to figure out how local and indigenous knowledge can provide answers and climate resilience.”

- See more at: http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/climate-change-and-water-mismanagement-parch-egypt#sthash.NavKkkxR.dpuf

 

A Time for Statesmanship

There is a small silver lining to the dark cloud that hangs over U.S.-Egypt relations following the failure of the Egyptian police to prevent the storming of the U.S. embassy in Cairo last week. President Mohamed Morsi, the Freedom and Justice Party, and the Muslim Brotherhood demonstrated that they are beginning the transition from opposition to statesmanship.

Such statesmanship, in turn, will be required of U.S. leaders in order to recognize the difficulty of the situation Arab governments face and to avoid further inflaming it.

To be sure, Egyptian statesmanship was not in evidence on September 11, 2012, as hundreds of protesters waving black flags and tearing the American stars and stripes to shreds breached the walls of the U.S. embassy. It took President Morsi twenty-seven hours to denounce the assault. But he and his party caught their mistake, and have hurried to make up for lost time. Morsi’s press release last Wednesday night, his somber televised address on Thursday evening, the online posting of Deputy Muslim Brotherhood Guide Khairat al-Shater’s statement of concern for the safety of the American diplomatic mission, all represent an acknowledgement by the Egyptian government and the Brotherhood that their responsibility to protect diplomatic missions is absolute, no matter the circumstances that lead to the threat.

For a new and inexperienced party, thrust quite unexpectedly into the responsibilities of government and facing its first major foreign policy crisis, this response should be seen as a glass half full, not half empty. At least the change in approach is going in the right direction. In other countries, too, signs of responsible reactions to the crisis can be seen. In Libya, for example, a demonstration was organized to protest the sacking of the U.S. consulate and the killing of the ambassador in Benghazi.

The new Egyptian government is in a difficult position. For the first time in its modern history, Egypt is now democratic enough that the government must take public opinion into consideration—a situation both President Barack Obama and his Republican challenger, Mitt Romney, should be able to identify with. The country will probably hold parliamentary elections in a few months, and anger is widespread at a deliberately provocative video, “The Innocence of Muslims.” Political opponents of the Morsi administration are already lining up to take advantage of it. Salafis and even secular politicians and members of the old regime are claiming that Morsi should have reacted strongly to the video—in other words, that he should have been ahead of the protesters.

In trying to balance domestic and foreign relations imperatives, Morsi initially put domestic political considerations ahead of statesmanship and stumbled. And he may stumble again as he tries to thread a very fine needle. Washington should be aware of his conundrum and try to help him through it.

Many governments across the Middle East and the Muslim world are facing the same dilemma as Morsi. Radical groups are deliberately fanning the flames of religious sensitivities for their own purposes, but it would be a serious mistake to disregard the genuine resentment of the United States that exists in many countries. That the reaction to the clumsy video spread so far and so quickly indicates it is giving voice to a deep-seated, underlying sentiment. Violence flared up rapidly not only across the Middle East, but even further afield, from Nigeria to Bangladesh. The situation is bound to get worse or at least to remain dangerously tense for a while.

It is the duty of Arab governments to curb the violence and protect the diplomatic missions. But it is equally incumbent on the Obama administration, as well as on Congress and the Romney campaign, to refrain from steps that will make matters worse. In doing their part to defuse tensions, they must also walk a fine line between domestic politics and international statesmanship. More

Statesmanship is sorely needed around the world today, perhaps more than at any time since the end of the Second World War. The world needs fewer politicians and more statesmen, statesmen with the vision to guide their countries, and to collaborate with other states in the international community for the benefit of all of humanity. Editor

In Paper, Chief of Egypt’s Army Criticized U.S.

As a student at the United States Army War College in Pennsylvania, the chief of staff of Egypt’s armed forces argued in a paper that the American military presence in the Middle East and its “one sided” support of Israel were fueling hatred toward the United States and miring it in an unwinnable global war with Islamist militants.

Gen. Sedky Sobhi

The paper, written seven years ago by the new chief of staff, Gen. Sedky Sobhi, offers an early and expansive look into the thinking of one member of the new generation of military officers stepping into power as part of a leadership shake-up under Egypt’s newly elected president, Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood.

General Sobhi’s sharp rebuke of American policy is especially striking because he now oversees the military institution that has been the closest United States ally in the Arab world, relied on by American officials as a critical bulwark in support of Israeli security and against Iranian influence. Despite decades of military collaboration, he urged a full pullout of American forces from the region.

Scholars say his paper is even more significant in part because many of its themes reflect opinions widely held by Egyptians, their new president and people throughout the region — an increasingly potent factor in regional foreign policy, as Egypt and other countries struggle toward democracy.

American officials said their confidence in Egypt was unshaken, while analysts argued that despite the changes in the nation’s military and civilian leadership, any realignment in relations with Washington could be slow — in part because of Egypt’s urgent need for assistance from the United States and the West.

“For sure there are going to be big changes in Egypt’s relationship with Washington,” said Shibley Telhami, a political scientist at the University of Maryland and a scholar at the Brookings Institution who has studied Arab and Egyptian public opinion.

In surveys across the Arab world for more than a decade, he said, about 70 percent of the public has named the United States as the second-greatest threat to regional security, after Israel — even in Egypt, where Washington provides $1.3 billion in annual military aid, and in Saudi Arabia, another close American ally.

As General Sobhi argued, Professor Telhami said, “there were always two central issues driving Arab and Egyptian anger with the U.S., the Palestinian question — the prism of pain through which Arabs see the West — and the U.S. military presence.”

General Sobhi’s paper, first reported by an independent journalist in Cairo, Issandr El Amrani, offers a rare look into the foreign policy thinking of a military institution often considered all but impenetrable to outsiders.

For decades under President Hosni Mubarak, the Egyptian military, and the nation’s foreign policy, had been closely allied with the United States and its regional interests. There was concern in Washington after Mr. Mubarak’s ouster that the relationship might not survive — an anxiety that was revived when Mr. Morsi was elected president.

But Washington knew that the longtime defense minister, Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, and his chief of staff, Sami Hafez Anan, still wielded considerable power and were reliable allies.

Then, after an embarrassing terrorist attack in northern Sinai this month, Mr. Morsi appeared to consolidate his power by announcing their replacement, while keeping them on as presidential advisers. The shake-up raised for the first time the possibility that Mr. Morsi might begin to exert some real sway over Egyptian foreign policy, and General Sobhi’s paper suggested that at least some of the younger cadre of generals might share an interest in more independence from Washington. More

 

Vote for the Brother

THE likely choice of candidates in the run-off on June 16th and 17th to decide who will be Egypt’s next president is not what The Economist had hoped for. That is hardly surprising, since we incline towards liberalism, and the Arab spring has not fostered it in the Arab world’s biggest country.

Amr Moussa, the diplomat we supported in the first round, was trounced, and Egyptians now have a wretched choice between Muhammad Morsi, a dreary Muslim Brother who narrowly won the first round, and Ahmed Shafiq, a former air-force chief and standard-bearer for the Mubarak old guard.

Even now the contest is plagued by uncertainty. As we went to press, the supreme court was due to rule on whether to exclude Mr Shafiq from the run-off because of his role in the old regime. Such a chaotic debut for democracy would tempt ordinary Egyptians to pine for the brutal certitudes of Mr Mubarak’s rule. Better that the vote take place—and that Mr Morsi, the Muslim Brother, become president of the Arab world’s biggest country.

People are nervous of the Muslim Brothers. Many secular-minded Arabs fear that if ever they gained power they would never let go. However slickly the Islamists repackage themselves, a strain of intolerance runs through them, particularly in religion. Egypt’s 8m Christians, about 10% of the population, are understandably anxious—not least because, to get elected, Mr Morsi will need the support not just of the Brothers but also of the Salafists, a far more worrying band of Islamists who hark back to the puritanism of the Prophet Muhammad’s era and who have amassed an alarming degree of popular support in the new Egypt. Already, the Brothers and the Salafists hold a majority in Egypt’s parliament. Should a Muslim Brother become president, the risk is that the Islamists will then ride roughshod over the rest. That is the fear of many secular Egyptians; and Israelis are worried too. More